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In this thesis, we report on fruitful applications of the theory of saturated probability
spaces developed by Hoover and Keisler (1984) into economic theory, as poineered by
Keisler and Sun (2009).
Many economic models include random shocks imposed on a large number (con-
tinuum) of economic agents with individual risk. In this context, an exact law of large
numbers and its converse are presented in Sun (2006) to characterize the cancelation of
individual risk via aggregation. However, it is well known that the Lebesgue unit interval
is not suitable for modeling a continuum of agents in the particular setting. The purpose
of Chapter 3 is to show that an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval does work well
as an agent space with various desirable properties associated with individual risk.
Purification results are important in game theory and statistical decision theory.
In Chapter 4, we prove a new purification theorem based on saturated probability spaces
that generalizes several earlier results. The key idea of our proof is to make use of the
exact law of large numbers. Compared to the existence results in Loeb and Sun (2006,
xi
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2009) and Podczeck (2009), we can obtain many purifications simultaneously.
In a finite-player game with uncountably infinite actions and diffused, independent
information, pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist if the diffused information is
modeled by Lebesgue spaces, see Khan et al. (1999). In Chapter 5, we provide a complete
answer to this puzzle by modeling diffused information as saturated probability spaces.
First, there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in these games if diffused
information is modeled by saturated probability spaces. Second, given a diffused and
independent information structure, if each player’s action space is uncountable infinite,
to ensure that there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every such game, the
diffused information structure must be modeled by a saturated probability space.
Recent advances in the theory of correspondences have been shaped by counter-
examples which hinge on the non-existence of Lebesgue-measurable selections with de-
sired properties. A robust theory has been established by Keisler and Sun (2009) where
saturated probability spaces provide a sufficient and necessary framework to obtain such
desired properties. In contrast, we show in Chapter 6 that a countably-generated exten-
sion of the Lebesgue interval resolves these non-existence results, but does not contradict
the necessity result in Keisler and Sun (2009). We draw the implications of our results
for the theory of large (non-anonymous) games and private information games.
Chapter 1
Introduction
In Economic Theory, atomless probability spaces are widely used to describe or model
institutions having a large number of competing participants in political and economic
life, for examples, markets, exchanges, corporations (from the shareholders’ viewpoint)
etc. One advantage of such a modeling is that probability theory can provide a powerful
and simple tool. This advantage is illustrated by an influential paper, Aumann (1964).
In particular, using Lebesgue interval, the unit interval [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue
measure, as the set of agents of a large exchange economy, Aumann showed that the
set of competitive allocations and the core coincide. His model provided a successful
formalization of Edgeworth’s 1881 conjecture.
In this thesis, we mainly investigate fruitful applications of a special class of proba-
bility spaces, the so-called saturated probability spaces, in Economic Theory. The notion
of saturated probability spaces was introduced in the literature by Hoover and Keisler
(1984). Loosely speaking, a probability space is saturated if its σ-algebra restricted to
any set with positive measure is never countably generated modulo all the null subsets
(see Definition 2.1.2 below). Note that the Lebesgue unit interval is not a saturated
probability space since the relevant σ-algebra is countably generated.
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As influenced by Aumann (1964), the Lebesuge unit interval is the archetype or typ-
ical space to model the large agent space in the literature.1 However, it has been found
in Khan et al. (1997, 1999), Sun (1996, 2006) that this typical atomless probability s-
pace, the Lebesgue unit interval, does not have a number of desirable properties, for
example, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in both games with many players and
finite-player games with diffused and independent information; the regularity properties
for distributions of correspondences such as convexity, closedness, compactness and p-
reservation of upper semi-continuity; and the modeling of index space in a rich Fubini
extension.
In light of the failure to obtain the above desired properties, the question arises
whether additional measure-theoretic structure will allow us to retain these desired prop-
erties. In asking this question, we are guided by the emphasis of Aumann (1964) that
it is only the atomlessness of the measure space is of significance in his model. This
question is answered in affirmative by Khan and Sun (1999), Sun (1996, 1998a), where
the so-called Loeb probability space introduced by Loeb (1975)2 is well-suited to obtain
all the desirable properties mentioned above. These earlier papers use methods from
nonstandard analysis.
Furthermore, one may ask whether we can work in the conventional measure-theoretic
framework, instead of the nonstandard analysis method, to obtain the desired properties.
In a pioneer paper, it was found by Keisler and Sun (2009) that the saturated proba-
bility spaces do provide an ideal measure-theoretic framework to obtain some desired
properties. In particular, Keisler and Sun showed that some desired properties are valid
on any saturated probability space but invalid on any non-saturated probability space.3
These properties, for instance, include various regularity properties (such as convexity,
1This modeling is the standard assumption in the theory of value in large economy, see
Aumann and Shapley (1974, p.13, (2.1)).
2See also Loeb and Wolff (2000) for details of the construction.
3Any atomless Leob probability space is a saturated probability space, see Hoover and Keisler (1984).
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closedness, compactness, preservation of upper semi-continuity) on distributions of cor-
respondences defined on a probability space, and the existence of pure strategy equilibria
in games with many players.
Followed Keisler and Sun (2009), saturated probability spaces have found applica-
tions in many branches in Economic Theory. For recent advancement, see Khan (2010),
Khan et al. (2005), Khan and Zhang (2010a,b), Loeb and Sun (2009), Noguchi (2009),
Podczeck (2008, 2009), Sun and Yannelis (2008), Wang and Zhang (2010). In this the-
sis, we report on fruitful applications of the theory of saturated probability spaces to
Economic Theory. In particular, we focus on the modeling of agent spaces in rich Fubini
extensions as presented in Sun (2006), on general purification theorem as established in
Dvorestzky et al. (1950, 1951b) and on the modeling of diffused information for private
information games as in Milgrom and Weber (1985), Radner and Rosenthal (1982). In
the sequel, we will review such applications in length in the following parts separately.
1.1 Basic Ideas of Keisler and Sun (2009)
In this part we will review some fundamental ideas of Keisler and Sun (2009), while
focusing on the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with many players. In
such a game, it concerns a continuum of players whose interactions are mediated by
some aggregate measure of their actions. In addition, any individual player is strategic
negligible in the sense that his or her actions do not affect social interactions even though
they are affected by them.
In such a game, if the action sets are finite or countably infinite, and if the space of
players, or agent space, is modeled by an arbitrary atomless probability space, e.g., the
Lebesgue probability space, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (see Schmeidler
1973). However, if the action set is uncountably infinite, decisive counterexamples can
be constructed where the pure strategy equilibria do not exist (see Rath et al. 1995 and
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Khan et al. 1997).
To resolve the above non-existence problem, a comprehensive theory is available by
modeling the agent space by atomless Loeb probability spaces (see Khan and Sun 1996,
1999).4 That is, for large non-anonymous games, if the agent space is modeled by an
atomless Loeb probability space, there does exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, Keisler and Sun (2009) also showed that if the agent space is modeled by
a saturated probability space, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every
large non-anonymous game. Recall that atomless Loeb probability spaces are saturated
probability spaces, thus the results in Keisler and Sun (2009) are more general than the
results based on atomless Loeb probability spaces.
Indeed, as emphasized by Keisler and Sun (2009), there is a general technique to
obtain more general results on saturated probability spaces from the existing results
on atomless Loeb probability spaces while such results on Lebesgue probability spaces
are not available. For this general technique itself, what Keisler and Sun wrote in the
following is of considerable interest.
“There are many desirable properties that hold on all saturated probability
spaces but fail everywhere else. Any probability space that out-performs the
Lebesgue unit interval in almost any way at all is already saturated. We
demonstrate a general technique for extending certain types of results from
atomless Loeb probability spaces (or even the simplest hyperfinite Loeb count-
ing spaces) to all saturated probability spaces. Thus, hyperfinite Loeb count-
ing spaces can play a prototype role in the class of all saturated probability
spaces.”
Many recent papers on applications of saturated probability spaces in Economic The-
ory can be viewed as illustrations of this general technique. For example, Podczeck (2009)
4See also Khan and Sun (2002) for a systematical discussion about the results mentioned above on
the theory of large games.
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and Loeb and Sun (2009) generalize the results in Loeb and Sun (2006) about the pu-
rification theorem; Podczeck (2008) and Sun and Yannelis (2008) generalize the results
in Sun (1997) on the regular properties for integral of correspondences. Some results in
Chapter 5 is also motivated by this general technique.
As mentioned, if modeling the agent space by saturated probability spaces, there
exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every such large game. In other words, the
framework of saturated probability spaces is a sufficient framework to model the agent
space to obtain pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such games. More interestingly, as
pioneered in Keisler and Sun (2009), the saturation property also furnishes a necessary
condition to model the agent space in the following sense. Given a model of the agent
space and a uncountably infinite action space, if there exists a pure strategy Nash e-
quilibrium for every large game, then the agent space must be modeled by a saturated
probability space; see Keisler and Sun (2009, Theorem 4.6). Combined with the suffi-
ciency result, it is implied by the necessity result that the saturated probability space
provides an ideal framework, which is both sufficient and necessary, to model the agen-
t space in the theory of large non-anonymous games where there always exists a pure
strategy equilibrium.
Actually, as the general technique mentioned above, this necessity result is an-
other general technique to work with saturated probability spaces. Here we quote
Keisler and Sun (2009) again as follows, where this necessity is commented in a per-
suasive and definitive way.
“Atomless Loeb spaces have the desired properties for correspondences and
large games. One realized that [such] spaces are very rich in the sense that
they have many more measurable sets than the Lebesgue unit interval. [Once]
it was shown that every atomless Loeb space is saturated, this gave a hint
that these properties might hold for all saturated probability spaces. Here
we also get converse results showing that the desired properties fail on every
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non-saturated probability space.”
As mentioned in the quote, what plays a vital role in the necessity result is that the
saturated probability spaces have many more measurable sets, or a richer information (or
sigma algebra) structure, than the Lebesgue unit interval. Note that in the modeling of
agent space in large non-anonymous games, the necessity result is phrased as follows. If
there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every large non-anonymous game with a
uncountably infinite action space, the agent space must be modeled by a saturated prob-
ability space. One natural question is that, as far as the counterexample in Rath et al.
(1995) or Khan et al. (1997) is concerned, what additional measure-theoretic structure
in the modeling of the agent space allows us to obtain a pure strategy equilibrium? In
particular, in such a special case, to obtain a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, how rich
should the structure require to guarantee the existence of pure strategy equilibrium?
Need we go so further to model the agent spaces by saturated probability spaces? These
questions are answered and discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
1.2 Exact Law of Large Numbers (ELLN)
Many economic models have also been based on a continuum of agents with individual
risk. Formally, a continuum of independent random variables are used to model individ-
ual level random shocks imposed on a large number of economic agents. This literature
appeals to a basic intuition underlying the theory of insurance whereby the classical
law of large numbers is used to eliminate independent (idiosyncratic or non-systematic)
risks.5 The desirable result is the ELLN which guarantees the cancelation of individual
risk at the aggregate level. See Sun (2006) for many earlier references on this, and for
some recent applications in Economic Theory of ELLN, see Duffie et al. (2005, 2007),
Duffie and Sun (2007), Lagos and Rocheteau (2007), McLean and Postlewaite (2002,
5See Sun (2006, Section 3) for details.
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2005), Sun and Yannelis (2008), Weill (2007).
However, unlike the case of a continuum of agents in a deterministic model, it is
well known that an economic model with an i.i.d. process based the classical continuum
product space and indexed by the Lebesgue unit interval has the sample measurability
problem.6 More generally, the independence and joint measurability with respect to the
usual measure-theoretic product are never compatible with each other except for some
trivial cases.7 What is thus needed is a suitable analytical framework that renders these
twin assumptions of independence and joint measurability compatible with each other.
As established in Sun (1998a,b, 1999), the Loeb product probability spaces do provide
such a framework. Furthermore, Sun (2006) found that it is the Keisler-Fubini property
in the Leob product that plays the dispensable role, then he proposed the notion of Fubini
extension. A Fubini extension of the usual product probability spaces is an extension
of the usual product measure to a measure which preserves the Fubini property with
respect to the factor measures (see Definition 3.2.2).
The framework of Fubini extension plays a fundamental role to study ELLN. Indeed,
this framework is “necessary and sufficient” for the establishment of ELLN. First, as in
Lemma 3.2.6, in such a framework, the ELLN holds in any non-negligible coalition level;
in addition, the converse of this exact law also holds in the sense that if the required
consequences of this exact law nontrivially holds in all non-negligible coalition levels, then
the process should be essentially pairwise independent. Second, if a process is essentially
pairwise independent and satisfies this property of coalitional aggregate certainty (see
Definition 3.2.5), then there exists a Fubini extension in which the process is measurable;
see Sun (2007a).
In Chapter 3, we mainly focus on the construction of the following non-trivial Fubini
6See Doob (1937, 1953), Judd (1985) and Sun (2006) for detailed discussion about this measurability
problem.
7See Sun (2006, Proposition 2.1).
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extension, rich Fubini extensions.8 A rich Fubini extension is defined to be a Fubini
extension that includes a measurable process with essentially i.i.d. random variables of
uniform distribution. A Fubini extension is rich in the sense that one can construct
processes on it with essentially pairwise independent random variables that have any
given variety of distributions on a general Polish space.
To construct rich Fubini extensions, one is led to answer the following questions.
What measure-theoretic structure should be imposed to allow us to construct a rich
Fubini extension? If possible, is it possible to provide a characterization of such a relevant
mesure-theoretic structure? Put differently, in a situation where ELLN is applied, what
additional measure-theoretic structure allow us to model the agent space?
Many probability spaces can be used as the relevant index space in rich Fubini ex-
tensions. For example, one can construct rich Fubini extensions based on the big class
of atomless Loeb probability spaces (see Sun 1998a). As in Sun (2006, Proposition 5.6),
one can also work with the interval [0, 1] as the index, but this interval is associated
with a particular measure-theoretic structure obtained from a hyperfinite Loeb counting
space via a bijection. However, for the Lebesgue unit interval, the archetype agent space
widely used in many economic models, the answer is negative.9 It is also pointed out
in Feldman and Gilles (1985, Section 1) that a continuum of i.i.d. Bernoulli random
variables indexed by the Lebesgue unit interval cannot satisfy the property of coalitional
aggregate certainty, the predictable result by ELLN.
Since the Lebesgue unit interval is the simplest atomless probability space and it is
not suitable for modeling a continuum of agents with individual risk, a natural question
is whether one can find some extension10 of the Lebesgue unit interval as the agent space
with the desired property.
8It is called rich product probability space in Sun (2006).
9See Sun (2006, Section 4) for details.
10Here an extension (I,I, λ) of the Lebesgue unit interval means that the index set I of agents is still
the unit interval [0, 1] while I is a σ-algebra extending the Lebesgue σ-algebra L and the restriction of
the measure λ to L is the Lebesgue measure η. For details, see the two paragraphs above Theorem 3.3.1.
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The purpose of Chapter 3 is to provide a positive answer to this question, see The-
orem 3.3.1. In particular, we construct essentially pairwise independent processes mea-
surable in a Fubini extension, where the sample functions are measurable with respect
to some extension of the Lebesgue unit interval and the random variables can take any
given variety of distributions. It follows immediately from the exact law of large numbers
that the type of result as mentioned in Feldman and Gilles (1985, Section 1) holds for
some extension of the Lebesgue unit interval. The point is that though the Lebesgue
unit interval fails to be an agent space modeling a continuum of agents with individual
risk, some extension of it does work.
Notice that the Lebesgue unit interval fails to serve as the relevant index space in a
rich Fubini extension while every atomless Loeb probability space works. According to
the general technique mentioned above, one natural question arises whether any saturated
probability space can serve as the index space in a rich Fubini extension. Actually, in
Theorem 3.3.1, since the Lebesgue extension above is a saturated probability space, thus
we provide a partial answer to this question. After the publication of the main result of
Chapter 3 as Sun and Zhang (2009), Podczeck (2010) provide a better answer for this
question, i.e., any saturated probability space can serve as the index space in a rich
Fubini extension.
Finally, another general technique about saturated probability spaces also works here.
That is, saturated probability spaces also furnishes a necessary measure-theoretic struc-
ture to model index spaces in rich Fubini extensions. In particular, if there is a rich
Fubini extension built on some index space, then the index space must be a saturated
probability space (See Theorem 3.4.3).
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1.3 Purification
In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the game theory into Economics.
After that, in a ground breaking paper, Nash (1950) proposed and showed the exis-
tence of the so-called Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies). In a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium, instead of taking some particular action, each player is required to choose a
distribution over his or her action sets. Such a solution concept has long been criticized
for the lack of sufficient support from behavioral evidence in the real world, e.g.,, “outside
of Las Vegas we do not spin roulettes” (see Rubinstein 1991, p. 913). Therefore, there
is a need to develop a robust theory on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
In 1950s, Dvoretzky, Wald and Wolfowitz (1950, 1951a, 1951b) present a general blan-
ket result to establish the existence of pure strategies for statistical decision problems and
two person zero-sum games that are based on atomless measures and finite action spaces.
This result, namely Dvorestzky et al. (1951a, Theorem 4), DWW Theorem hereafter for
short, is a generalization of Lyapunov’s theorem on the range of a finite dimensional vec-
tor measure. To be precise, it says that corresponding to any mixed strategy with finite
actions, there exists a pure strategy with identical integrals with respect to a finite set of
atomless measures on a measurable space. Here the pure strategy is called a purification
of the mixed strategy. Many results on pure pure strategy Nash equilibria for atomless
games with finite actions can simply viewed as applications of DWW’s purification re-
sult, for example, Schmeidler (1973), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Radner and Rosenthal
(1982) etc. For a survey on these purification results, see Khan et al. (2006).
However, Lyapunov’s theorem fails in an infinite dimensional space, similarly, the
general purification procedure due to Dvoretsky, Wald and Wolfowitz only works for finite
action spaces. Notice that game-theoretic models with infinite action spaces, countably
or uncountably infinite, are widely used in Economic Theory. Hence there is a natural
need to extend DWW Theorem to a general case where the action space is allowed to be
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infinite.
In this regard, DWW Theorem has been generalized in several ways. Edwards (1987)
shows that DWW Theorem still holds for a countable infinite action space without any
additional assumptions; see also Khan and Rath (2009) for an elementary proof. In
the context of an uncountable action space, Loeb and Sun (2006) show a generalization
of DWW Theorem by working with atomless Loeb measure spaces instead of atomless
measure spaces, and such a generalization is invalid if working with the Lebesgue unit
interval. Finally, a more general version of DWW Theorem is presented in Podczeck
(2009) and Loeb and Sun (2009), where atomless Loeb probability spaces are replaced
by more general saturated probability spaces. Thus, the generalization of DWWTheorem
with uncountable infinite action spaces can be viewed as an application of the general
technique in Section 1.1.
The main focus of Chapter 4 is a generalization of DWW Theorem and its applica-
tions. In this chapter we will establish a far-reaching generalization of DWW Theorem,
see Theorem 4.2.1. In particular, it generalizes the results of Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009)
and Podczeck (2009) in the following two ways. First, we work with a general Polish
action space instead of a compact metric space. Second, we require the payoff functions
to be jointly measurable, while in Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009) and Podczeck (2009), the
payoff functions should satisfy a more restrictive condition, the Carathe´odory condition
(see Section 4.2).
Our proof is built heavily on the ELLN as reviewed above. This ELLN approach is
different from the techniques used in Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009) and Podczeck (2009). In
particular, Loeb and Sun (2006) make use of the nonstandard analysis. Loeb and Sun
(2009) apply techniques of Hoover and Keisler (1984) that certain properties can be
transferred from one saturated probability space to another. And in Podczeck (2009),
the main result is proved through establishing new results in functional analysis. It is
worthwhile to note that in Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009), Podczeck (2009), the proofs of
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their purification theorems depend on the setting that the action space is a compact
metric space and the payoff functions satisfy the Carathe´odory condition. Thus, their
methods cannot be applied to the setting of our main result, Theorem 4.2.1, directly.
One advantage of this ELLN approach is that one can simultaneously obtain many
required purification mappings. Specifically, these purification mappings can be indexed
by a full subset in an atomless probability space. In comparison, note that in the earlier
purification results only the existence of some purification mapping has been established.
The relevance of the ELLN to the ex post Nash equilibrium of a large game with idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty is already considered in Theorem 7 of Khan and Sun (2002, p. 1792).
Further results on ex post Nash equilibrium in large games are established in Khan et al.
(2005) and Sun (2007b).
As an application of our generalized purification result, Theorem 4.2.1, in Chapter 5,
we will also establish the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in private information
games as formulated in Milgrom and Weber (1985), Radner and Rosenthal (1982), see
Theorem 5.2.6.
1.4 Private Information Games
Now we turn to the modeling of the diffused information in private information games
with finite players as formulated in Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Radner and Rosenthal
(1982). From the methodology point of view, this modeling is parallel to the modeling
of the agent spaces in the theory of large games as mentioned in Section 1.1. See also
Khan and Sun (2002, Section 4) for the relationship between the private information
games and large non-anonymous games.11
In game theory, for strategic-form games, it is well known that pure strategy Nash
equilibria may not exist. However, as mentioned above, in the private information games
11See also Fu (2007).
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formulated in Milgrom and Weber (1985), Radner and Rosenthal (1982), i.e., if the ac-
tions spaces are finite, the private information is diffused enough and independent, suit-
ably formalized, there does exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. It is worthwhile
to note that these results are straightforward applications of the purification theorem,
namely DWW Theorem mentioned in Section 1.3. Moreover, these existence results also
positive if the action spaces are countably infinite sets, see Khan and Sun (1995).
However, if the action spaces are uncountably infinite, there may not exist a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in the game-theoretic models in Milgrom and Weber (1985),
Radner and Rosenthal (1982). In Khan et al. (1999), such a counterexample was first
constructed where the diffused information for each player is modeled by the Lebesgue
spaces, and the action spaces can be any uncountable infinite compact metric spaces. To
resolve such a nonexistence problem, positive results on the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibria for private information games are established where the diffused infor-
mation structure is modeled by atomless Loeb probability spaces, see Khan and Sun
(1999). In this regard, to ensure the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium, just
like the modeling of the agent space in large games in Section 1.1, it is also important to
choose suitable measure-theoretic structure to model the diffused information in private
information games.
In Chapter 5, according to the general technique mentioned in Section 1.1, if modeling
the diffused information for each player by saturated probability spaces, there does exist
a pure strategy equilibrium in any private information game, see Theorem 5.2.6. The
basic idea in the proof this result is to apply the purification theorem established in
Chapter 4. In particular, first, the existence of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in
such a game is well known,12 then the general purification theorem established on the
saturated probability spaces, Theorem 4.2.1, can be applied to obtain a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
12See e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1985), Balder (1988), also Fu (2008) for a recent formulation.
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As pointed out in Section 1.1, one advantage to work with the saturated probability
space in the model is to establish certain sufficient and necessary results. It is natural to
investigate the necessary counterpart of Theorem 5.2.6. To be precise, in the model of
private information games, could the saturation probability space also provide a necessary
measure-theoretic structure to model the diffused information, in the sense that there
exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in private information games.
In Chapter 5, we answer this question in affirmative, see our main result Theo-
rem 5.3.8. In particular, given that an information structure satisfies the specific re-
quirement of conditional independence and diffuseness, given a set of uncountably infi-
nite action spaces, if there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in every private information
game with the given fixed information and action structures, then each player’s diffused
information must be a saturated probability space. Put differently, in such a setting,
if the diffused information for some player is not saturated, i.e., his or her information
structure is not rich enough (compared to a saturated information structure), then the
lack of this saturation leaves some room for a counterexample in which the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium does not exist.
1.5 Lebesgue Extensions and Correspondences
In Economic Theory, when an economic agent is required to take several actions under
certain constraints, his or her optimal actions may not be unique. As a result, there is a
need to work with mapping whose values are nonempty sets. Such mappings are usually
called correspondences or multifunctions or random sets. In the literature, one usual-
ly studies correspondences under some measure-theoretic or topological structure. The
study of such correspondences and their selections has widely applied in Economic The-
ory, see Aumann (1965), Debreu (1959, 1967), Hart and Kohlberg (1974), Hildenbrand
(1974) etc.
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Let Ψ be a correspondence from a probability space (I,I, λ) to a Polish space, i.e., a
complete separable metric space. A natural structure arising from the correspondence Ψ
is the set DΨ(λ) consisting of the distributions induced by all the I-measurable selections
of Ψ. In Chapter 6, we mainly focus on several desired regular properties of DΨ(λ), for
example, closedness, convexity.
The study of such regular properties is of special interest in Game Theory. In a
milestone paper, Nash (1950) developed the concept of so-called Nash equilibrium in
which each player is to maximize his own payoff given the others’ strategies. The proof
of the existence of Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies) is a straightforward applica-
tion of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem for correspondences. After Nash’s revolutionary
application of fixed point theorem in Game Theory, this methodology has been used to
show the existence of certain equilibria in other classes of games. Specifically, in the
theory of games with many players (see Section 1.1), to apply the fixed point theorem in
the existence of Nash equilibrium, one is naturally led to consider the regular properties
mentioned above for the distribution of the correspondences, see Khan and Sun (2002)
for a survey.
Now let us turn back to DΨ(λ), the distribution of the correspondence Ψ. When
the underlying probability space (I,I, λ) is a general probability space, e.g., the unit
Lebesgue interval, the desired regular properties mentioned above such as closedness,
convexity, compactness, preservation of the upper semi-continuity may not hold. For
example, for the Debreu correspondence Ψ(t) = {−t, t} defined on the Lebesgue unit
interval 13 its distribution is neither closed nor convex. See Sun (1996), Loeb and Wolff
(2000, Chapter 8) and Chapter 6 for other claims rooted in the Debreu correspondence.
Based on this invalidity of the distribution of the Debreu correspondence, many coun-
terexamples have been constructed to illustrate how Lebesgue unit interval is not an
appropriate measure-theoretic structure in the theory of atomless games, both in games
13See Debreu (1967).
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with many players and games with private information.14
As a result, there is a need to establish a robust theory on the desired regular prop-
erties of the correspondences while abandoning the use of the Lebesgue unit interval.
Such a theory has been established on atomless Loeb probability spaces as in Sun (1996,
1997). Moreover, according to the general technique in Section 1.1, the results have
been lifted to the general class of saturated probability spaces. Most importantly, as
mentioned previously, Keisler and Sun (2009) have shown that the saturated probability
spaces also furnish a necessary measure-theoretic structure to obtain the desired regular
properties.
It is very important to understand the necessity result in Keisler and Sun (2009). In
terms of the distribution of correspondences, Loeb and Sun (2009, Theorem 3.6, P2-
P3) formulated the necessity result as follows: if the distribution of any closed valued
correspondence is closed and convex, then the underlying probability space is a saturated
probability space. Recall that the distribution of the Debreu correspondence based on
the Lebesgue unit interval is neither closed nor convex.
In Chapter 6, we argue that in so far as the Debreu correspondence is concerned,
one need not go all the way to the complexity of saturated probability spaces, and
that the required selections can be found by a simple countably-generated extension of
the Lebesgue interval. To put the matter another way, we propose a probability space
with a countably-generated σ-algebra which suffices to negate difficulties incurred on the
Debreu correspondence, and thereby suffices for the substantive applications. Our results
then point out the need for a compelling and a natural example for which our proposed
probability space does not work, and for which a saturated probability space is essential.
To be sure, given the Keisler and Sun (2009) necessity results, such an example exists.
In Chapter 6, with various Lebesgue extensions constructed in Section 2.2, we can
14See Khan and Sun (2002) for a survey of such counterexamples in large games and Khan et al. (1999)
for a counterexample in private information games.
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understand the necessity result in Keisler and Sun (2009) as follows. As far as the spe-
cific correspondence Ψ is concerned, one need not go all the way to the complexity of
saturated probability spaces, and that the required selections can be found in a sim-
ple countably-generated extension, (I,I, λ), of the Lebesgue interval (I,L, η). Now, as
the space (I,I, λ) is not saturated, there must exist a set-valued function defined on
it whose distribution is not closed and/or convex. What is interesting, and somewhat
of a surprise, is that this existential statement can be underscored by a constructive
one; and furthermore, the set-valued function exhibiting “irregularities” on the extended
space is a “simple” transformation of the originally given one. And the nature of the
transformation is such that the extended space (I,I, λ) can be extended one more time
to a countably-generated space (I,I1, λ1) to subdue the irregularities of the transformed
set-valued function in precisely the same way that the original correspondence was sub-
dued! But the fact that (I,I1, λ1) is also countably-generated, a second appeal to the
Keisler-Sun necessity results leads to a repetition of the process. And this repetition
can be continued ad infinitum to obtain {(I,In, λn)}n∈N, thereby giving insight into how
rich a saturated probability space really is. It cannot be attained in a countably infinite
number of extensions.
1.6 Organization of the Thesis
The main results in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are based on the papers Sun and Zhang
(2009), Wang and Zhang (2010), Khan and Zhang (2010b) and Khan and Zhang (2010a)
separately.
This paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present basic definitions and
properties of the saturated probability spaces and a general method to construct various
Lebesgue extensions. Chapter 3 deals with the modeling of the relevant index space in
rich Fubini extensions. A general purification theorem on saturated probability spaces
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is established in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 studies that how saturated probability spaces
are used to model the diffused information in private information games. In Chapter 6,
Lebesgue extensions are widely used to resolve the difficulties incurred on the Debreu
correspondence, and to understand the necessity of the saturation property in terms of
the distribution of the correspondences.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Throughout this thesis, a probability space means complete countably additive probabil-
ity space. A Polish space means a complete separable metric space. For a Polish space
X, denote its Borel σ-algebra by BX , and by M(X) the space of all Borel probability
measures associated with the topology of weak convergence.
In this chapter we first present the basic concepts of saturated probability spaces in
Section 2.1 and then a general method to extend the Lebesgue unit interval in Section 2.2.
2.1 Saturated Probability Space
We first present the definition of saturated probability spaces introduced by Hoover and Keisler
(1984).
Definition 2.1.1. A probability space (I,I, λ) is said to be saturated if for any two
Polish spaces X and Y , any Borel probability measure τ ∈ M(X × Y ) with marginal
probability measure τX on X, and any measurable mapping g from (I,I, λ) to X with
distribution τX , there exists a measurable mapping h : (I,I, λ) → Y such that the mea-
surable mapping (g, h) : (I,I, λ)→ X × Y has distribution τ .
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Given a probability space (I,I, λ), for any subset S ∈ I with λ(S) > 0, denote by
(S,IS , λS) the probability space restricted to S. Here IS := {S ∩ S′ : S′ ∈ I} and λS is
the probability measure re-scaled from the restriction of λ to IS. Given a subset C of I,
denote by σ(C) the smallest σ-algebra containing C.
Definition 2.1.2. A probability space (I,I, λ) is said to be countably-generated there
is a countable subset C ∈ I such that for any S ∈ I, there exists a C ∈ σ(C) such that
λ(S∆C) = 0. It is said to be nowhere countably generated if for any subset S ∈ I with
λ(S) > 0, (S,IS, λS) is not countably generated.
Remark 2.1.3. The concept of “nowhere countably-generatedness” is used in Loeb and Sun
(2009). There are other names for such an concept in literature, e.g., “rich” in an earlier
version of Keisler and Sun (2009), “super-atomless” in Podczeck (2008) etc; in addition,
this concept is also equivalent to “nowhere separable” in Dzˇamonja and Kunen (1995).
We next introduce the definition of ℵ1-atomlessness as in Hoover and Keisler (1984).
Definition 2.1.4. Let (I,I, λ) be a probability space.
(i) If A is a σ-algebra on I, we say that I is atomless over A if for every S ∈ I such
that λ(S) > 0 there is an S0 ⊆ S, such that on some set of positive probability,
0 < P [S0|A] < P [S|A],
where P [S|A] is the conditional probability of S with respect to the σ-algebra A. A
σ-algebra is atomless if it is atomless over the trivial a-algebra.
(ii) We say I is ℵ1-atomless if I is atomless over every A which is countably gener-
ated.
Fact 2.1.5. For each atomless probability space (I,I, λ), the following are equivalent:
(i) (I,I, λ) is saturated.
(ii) (I,I, λ) is ℵ1-atomless.
2.2 Lebesgue Extension 21
(iii) (I,I, λ) is nowhere countably generated.
(iv) The measure algebra of (I,I, λ) is a finite or countable convex combination of
measure algebras of the form [0, 1]α where α is an uncountable cardinal.
Proof The equivalence of (i) and (ii) is proved in Hoover and Keisler (1984, Corollary
4.5 (i)). The equivalence of (iii) and (iv) follows from Maharam’s theorem (see Maharam
1942). A direct proof that (i) is equivalent to (iv) is also given in Fajardo and Keisler
(2002, Theorem 3B.7).
The Lebesgue unit interval denoted by (I,L, η) is countably-generated and therefore
not a saturated probability space. In contrast, any atomless Loeb probability space is
saturated (see Hoover and Keisler 1984).
Corollary 2.1.6. If (I,I, λ) is a saturated probability space, then any other probability
space whose measure algebra is isomorphic to (Iˆ, λˆ) is also saturated.
2.2 Lebesgue Extension
In this section we present a general method to extend the Lebesgue unit interval, and
several variations of Lebesgue extension.
2.2.1 A General Technique
Before introducing the method, we first present the following lemma Kakutani (1944,
Lemma 2),1. It plays an important role in the construction. The proof of this lemma is
based on transfinite induction.
Lemma 2.2.1. There is a disjoint family C = {Ck : k ∈ K},K = [0, 1], of subsets of
I = [0, 1] such that
⋃
k∈K Ck = I, and for each k ∈ K, η∗(Ck) = 0 and η
∗(Ck) = 1,
where η∗ and η
∗ are the respective inner and outer measures of the Lebesgue measure η.
1In Sun and Zhang (2009), the reference is Fremlin (2003, Lemma 419I).
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Remark 2.2.2. The another version of this result, as presented in Fremlin (2003, Lem-
ma 419I), does not require
⋃
k∈K Ck = I. However, if
⋃
k∈K Ck 6= I, let B = I \
⋃
k∈K Ck.
Since the cardinality of B is at most the cardinality of K, the continuum, we can re-
distribute at most one point of B into each Ck in the family C to obtain the required
condition. Note also that we use both K and I to denote the unit interval.
We can now present a general construction of the Lebesgue extension in the following
five steps. The construction itself is of special interest, and we will use it for different
purposes in the sequel. Let (K,K, κ) be a probability space and K is a set with the
cardinality of the continuum.
Step 1 [Existence of C ⊆ I ×K]: Appeal to Lemma 2.2.1, define a subset C of I ×K
by letting C = {(i, k) ∈ I ×K : i ∈ Ck, k ∈ K}.
Step 2 [C has (η ⊗ κ)-outer measure one]: Let (L ×K,L ⊗ K, η ⊗ κ) be the usual
product probability space. For any L ⊗K-measurable set U that contains C, Ck ⊆ Uk
for each k ∈ K, where Uk = {i ∈ I : (i, k) ∈ U} is the k-section of U . The Fubini
property of η ⊗ κ implies that for κ-almost all k ∈ K, Uk is L-measurable, which means
that η(Uk) = 1 ( notice that η
∗(Ck) = 1). Since (η ⊗ κ)(U) =
∫
K η(Uk) dκ, we have
(η ⊗ κ)(U) = 1. Therefore, the (η ⊗ κ)-outer measure of C is one.
Step 3 [Measure structure on C]: the method in Doob (1953, p. 69) can be used to
extend η ⊗ κ to a measure γ on the σ-algebra U generated by the set C and the sets in
L ⊗K with γ(C) = 1. It is easy to see that U =
{
(U1 ∩ C) ∪ (U2\C) : U1, U2 ∈ L ⊗ K
}
,
and γ[(U1 ∩ C) ∪ (U2\C)] = η ⊗ κ(U1) for any measurable sets U1, U2 ∈ L ⊗ K.
Let T be the σ-algebra {U ∩ C : U ∈ L ⊗ K}, which is the collection of all the
measurable subsets of C in U . The restriction of γ to (C,T ) is still denoted by γ. Then,
γ(U ∩ C) = η ⊗ κ (U), for every measurable set U ∈ L ⊗ K. Note that (L ×K,U , γ) is
an extension of (L×K,L ⊗K, η ⊗ κ).
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Step 4 [New probability structure on I]: Consider the projection mapping p :
I × K → I with p(i, k) = i. Let ξ be the restriction of p to C. Since the family C
is a partition of I = [0, 1], ξ is a bijection between C and I. It is obvious that p is a
measure-preserving mapping from (I ×K,L ⊗K, η ⊗ κ) to (I,L, η), i.e., for any B ∈ L,
p−1(B) ∈ L⊗K and (η⊗κ)[p−1(B)] = η(B); and thus p is a measure-preserving mapping
from (L×K,U , γ) to (I,L, η). Since γ[ξ−1(B)] = γ[C ∩ p−1(B)] = η⊗κ[p−1(B)] = η(B)
for any B ∈ L, ξ is a measure-preserving mapping from (C,T , γ) to (I,L, η).
Now let I be the σ-algebra {S ⊆ I : ξ−1(S) ∈ T }. Define a set function λ on I
by letting λ(S) = γ[ξ−1(S)] for each S ∈ I. Since ξ is a bijection, λ is a well-defined
probability measure on (I,I). Hence (I,I, λ) is a probability space, and ξ is also an
isomorphism from (C,T , γ) to (I,I, λ).
Step 5 [Lebesgue extension]: Since (I,I, λ) is isomorphic to (C,T , γ) as probability
spaces, and ξ is a measure-preserving mapping from (C,T , γ) to (I,L, η), it is obvious
that (I,I, λ) is an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval (I,L, η).
The probability space (I,I, λ) is a countably-generated space since it is isomorphic
to (C,T , γ) via the isomorphism ξ.
This completes the construction, and we summarize it in Figure 1 below.
extensionrestriction
ξ is an isomorphism
(I ×K,L ⊗K, η ⊗ κ)(I ×K,U , γ)(C,T , γ)
(I,I, λ) = an extension of (I,L, η)
Figure 1: The construction of the Lebesgue extension.
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2.2.2 Variations of Lebesgue Extension
Remark 2.2.3. In the above construction, note that the measure algebra of (I,I, λ) is
isomorphic to the measure algebra of the product space (L×K,L⊗K, η⊗κ). As a result,
if (K,K, κ) is a saturated probability space, so is this product space and then (I,I, λ).
Analogously, since the Lebesgue unit interval is a countably generated, then if (K,K, κ)
is a countably generated, so is this product space and (I,I, λ). Next we consider two
special cases of the Lebesgue extension.
Indeed, such a construction of the saturated or non-separable extension of the Lebesgue
unit interval can be traced back to Kakutani (1944); see also Kodaira and Kakutani
(1950), Kakutani and Oxtoby (1950) who impose the additional requirement of invari-
ance of the extension.
In Chapter 3, we will work on a special Lebesgue extension where (K,K, κ) is a
probability space obtained from an atomless Loeb probability space via a bijection. As
argued above, in this case, the Lebesgue extension (I,I, λ) is a saturated probability
space.
In Chapter 6, instead of a saturated Lebesgue extension, we will work with a count-
ably generated Lebesgue extension. In particular, here (K,K, κ) is another copy of the
Lebesgue unit interval. As argued above, the Lebesgue extension in this case is a count-
ably generated probability space.
Extension of (I,I, λ)
In this subsection, we assume that (I,I, λ) is the Lebesgue extension obtained from
Section 2.2.1 and (K,K, κ) is another copy of the Lebesgue unit interval. In Chapter
6, together with such a countably generated Lebesgue extension (I,I, λ), we will also
work with a sequence of countably generated extension {(I,In, λn)}n∈N, where I =
[0, 1], (I,In, λn) is a countably generated extension of (I,In−1, λn−1) constructed as in
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Section 2.2.1. We next simply review how to construct a countably generated extension
(I,I1, λ1) of (I,I, λ).
Following the construction of (I,I, λ) in Section 2.2.1, we first reproduce an analogue
of Lemma 1 in Step 1 thereof. Recall that (K,K, κ) is a copy of the Lebesgue interval.
Lemma 2.2.4. On the probability space (I = [0, 1],I, λ), there is a disjoint family
{Dk : k ∈ [0, 1]} of subsets of I such that
⋃
k∈K Dk = I, and for each k ∈ [0, 1],
λ∗(Dk) = 0 and λ
∗(Dk) = 1, where λ∗ and λ
∗ are the respective inner and outer measures
of the probability measure λ.
Proof: The construction is based on (C,T , γ) in Step 3 of Section 2.2.1, where C =
∪k∈[0,1]{(i, k) : i ∈ Ck} and {Ck : k ∈ [0, 1]} is a partition of the Lebesgue unit interval
(I,L, η) with η∗(Ck) = 0, η
∗(Ck) = 1. Now for each k ∈ [0, 1], define a subset C
′
k ⊆ C
where C ′k = ∪k′∈Ck{(i, k
′) : i ∈ Ck′}. Notice that {Ck : k ∈ [0, 1]} is a partition of
(I,L, η), it is clear that {C ′k : k ∈ [0, 1]} is a partition of C as well. Moreover, for all k,
as a subset in the product probability space of two copies of the Lebesgue unit interval,
C ′k has (η ⊗ κ)-inner measure 0, outer measure 1. By the construction of (C,T , γ) (see
Step 3 thereof), every C ′k also has γ-inner measure 0, outer measure 1. Finally, let
Dk = ∪k′∈CkCk′ for each k ∈ [0, 1]. It is clear that {Dk : k ∈ [0, 1]} is the required
partition of (I,I, λ) because that (C,T , γ) and (I,I, λ) are isomorphic through the 1-1
map ξ.
With Lemma 2.2.4 in place, we can construct a countably-generated extension of
(I,I, λ) by applying Step 2-5 in Section 2.2.1 as follows: With {Dk : k ∈ [0, 1]}, we
can define C1 = {(i, k) : i ∈ Dk, k ∈ K}. It is a subset of the product probability
space (I × K,I ⊗K, λ ⊗ κ). Also, as in Steps 2-5, C1 has (λ ⊗ κ)-outer measure 1,
a probability structure on C1 can be constructed, and new probability structure on I,
(I,I1, λ1), can be derived from that on C
1 through the 1-1 mapping ξ1 : C1 → I. Finally,
it is worthwhile to note that (I,I1, λ1) is a countably-generated extension of (I,I, λ).
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Finally, we briefly introduce the construction of other (I,In, λn). We can construct
(I,I2, λ2) from (I,I1, λ1) in the same way as (I,I1, λ1) from (I,I, λ). And similarly,
we can continue this procedure inductively to construct (I,In, λn) from (I,In−1, λn−1)
for general n. Towards this end, the key is to establish an analogue of Lemma 2.2.4,





and for each k ∈ [0, 1], λn−1∗(D
n
k ) = 0 and λn−1
∗(Dk) = 1, where λn−1∗ and λn−1
∗
are the respective inner and outer measures of the probability measure λn−1. This also
can be obtained inductively from such a family of subsets in (I,In−2, λn−2) in the same
way of constructing {Dk : k ∈ K} in (I,I, λ) from { Ck : k ∈ K} in (I,L, η). Finally,
the construction of (I,In−1, λn−1) can be obtained by applying the Steps 2-5 in the
construction of (I,I, λ).
By the construction, note here that all (I,In, λn),∀n ∈ N are countably generated
probability spaces.
2.3 A Useful Result
We next review some concepts related to the measure algebra for a probability space.
Let (I,I, λ) be a probability space. Consider a relation ‘∼’ on I as follows, for
any E,F ∈ I, E ∼ F if and only if µ(E△F ) = 0, where △ denotes the symmetric
difference. It is clear that ∼ is an equivalence relation on I. For any E ∈ I, let
Eˆ = {F ∈ I : F ∼ E} be the equivalence class of E, and clearly E ∈ Eˆ; define the
canonical epimorphism πI : I → Iˆ ′ by letting πI(E) = Eˆ, for all E ∈ I. The pair (Iˆ, λˆ)
is said to be the measure algebra of (I,I, λ), here Iˆ is the quotient Boolean algebra for
the equivalence relation, i.e., the set of equivalence classes in I for ∼, and λˆ : Iˆ → [0, 1]
is given by λˆ(Eˆ) = λ(E), for some E ∈ Eˆ. We can define the operations ∪ˆ, ∩ˆ, \ˆ, △ˆ and
⊆ˆ on Iˆ in the following way: For any Eˆ, Fˆ ∈ Iˆ with E ∈ Eˆ and F ∈ Fˆ , Eˆ⊆ˆFˆ if and
only if λ(E \ F ) = 0, Eˆ∪ˆFˆ = Ê ∪ F , and analogously ∩ˆ, \ˆ and △ˆ are all well-defined. It
2.3 A Useful Result 27
is clear that Iˆ is an algebra under \ˆ and ∪ˆ.
Definition 2.3.1. Let (I,I, λ) and (I ′,I ′, λ′) be two measure spaces, and (Iˆ, λˆ) and
(Iˆ ′, λˆ′) be their measure algebras respectively. The measure preserving homomorphism
ρ : Iˆ → Iˆ ′, is said to be realized by a measure preserving map h : I ′ → I if for any
S ∈ I, πI′ [h
−1(S)] = ρ[πI(S)], where πI , πI′ are the canonical epimorphisms. In other









where the homomorphism h−1 is naturally derived by h.
For the Lebesgue interval (I,L, η), denote by (Lˆ, ηˆ) the measure-algebra. Let (T,T , γ)
be an atomless countably-generated probability space associated with the measure al-
gebra (Tˆ , γˆ) . By Maharam’s theorem (see Maharam 1942), there exists a measure-
preserving isomorphism ρ : Lˆ → Tˆ . The next result is Theorem 4.12 of Fremlin (1989,
p. 937).2 As in Keisler and Sun (2009, Theorem 2.7, p. 1589), we will use this result in
the sequel (in particular Chapters 5 and 6) to construct new counterexamples from old
ones.
Lemma 2.3.2. The measure algebra isomorphism ρ can be realized by a measure-preserving
mapping h from (T,T , γ) to the Lebesgue interval (I,L, η).
2See also Edgar (1976, Proposition 3.4) for an earlier version.

Chapter 3
Rich Fubini Extension with Lebesgue
Extension Agent Spaces
3.1 Introduction
Models with a continuum of agents are widely used in economics. The archetype agent
space is the unit interval [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure. However, it was
already noted by Aumann (1964) that the choice of the Lebesgue unit interval as a
model for the agent space is of no particular significance and any atomless probability
space is precisely what is needed to ensure that each individual agent has no influence.1
Many economic models have also been based on a continuum of agents with individual
risk. Formally, a continuum of independent random variables is used to model individual
level random shocks imposed on a large number of economic agents. The desirable result
is an exact law of large numbers which guarantees the cancelation of individual risk at
the aggregate level.2 It is shown in Sun (2006) that a process measurable in a Fubini
extension is essentially pairwise independent if and only if it satisfies the property of
1For this point, see p. 44 of Aumann (1964). For the discussion of various other formulations of
negligible agents, see Khan (2007) Khan (2010).
2See Sun (2006) for many earlier references on this.
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coalitional aggregate certainty.3 The latter means that aggregation at the coalitional
level removes uncertainty.
Section 5 of Sun (2006) considers the existence of a Fubini extension that allows one
to construct processes with essentially pairwise independent random variables taking any
given variety of distributions. Many probability spaces can be used as the relevant index
space; for example, the big class of atomless Loeb probability spaces. One can also work
with an index space based on some atomless measure space on the unit interval [0, 1].
However, unlike the case of a continuum of agents in a deterministic model, it is
well known that an economic model with an i.i.d. process based the classical continuum
product space and indexed by the Lebesgue unit interval has the sample measurability
problem. Moreover, Sun (2006, Corollary 4.3) shows that under the framework of a
Fubini extension, almost all sample functions of any non-trivial process with essentially
pairwise independent random variables cannot be Lebesgue measurable. It is also pointed
out in Feldman and Gilles (1985, Section 1 ) that a continuum of i.i.d. Bernoulli random
variables indexed by the Lebesgue unit interval cannot satisfy the property of coalitional
aggregate certainty.
Since the Lebesgue unit interval is the simplest atomless probability space and it is
not suitable for modeling a continuum of agents with individual risk, a natural question
is whether one can find some extension of the Lebesgue unit interval as the agent space
with the desired property. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a positive answer
to that question. In particular, we construct essentially pairwise independent processes
measurable in a Fubini extension, where the sample functions are measurable with respect
to some extension of the Lebesgue unit interval and the random variables can take any
given variety of distributions. It follows immediately from the exact law of large numbers
that the type of result as mentioned in Feldman and Gilles (1985, Section 1) holds for
3See Definitions 3.2.1 and 3.2.5 below respectively for the precise meaning of essential pairwise in-
dependence and coalitional aggregate certainty. The equivalence result is shown in Theorem 2.8 of Sun
(2006).
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some extension of the Lebesgue unit interval. The point is that though the Lebesgue
unit interval fails to be an agent space modeling a continuum of agents with individual
risk, some extension of it does work.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents some basic definitions and
properties on the exact law of large numbers. The main result is stated in Section 3.3.
In Section 3.5 we prove the main result, Theorem 3.3.1. Finally, we discussed the rela-
tion between saturation and the modeling of index spaces in rich Fubini extensions in
Section 3.5.
3.2 Basics on ELLN
Let (I,I, λ) be an atomless probability space which is used to model the agent space
of many economic agents. In our setting, it will be the parameter space for a process.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a sample probability space, which models the space of uncertain states
of the world. A process f from I × Ω to a Polish space X with Borel σ-algebra B is
a mapping from I × Ω to X such that (1) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the random shock fi
imposed on agent i is a random variable defined on (Ω,F , P ) whose distribution Pf−1i
on X is defined by Pf−1i (B) = P [f
−1
i (B)] for each B ∈ B; (2) for every B ∈ B, the
mapping i 7→ Pf−1i (B) is I-measurable.
The meaning of individual risk is that each individual agent is allowed to have cor-
relation with a negligible group of other agents. This is formalized as the concept of
essential pairwise independence.
Definition 3.2.1. A process f from I × Ω to a Polish space X is said to be essentially
pairwise independent if for λ-almost all s ∈ I, the random variables fs and fi are
independent for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
The main difficulty for working with an essentially pairwise independent process f
is that if it is jointly measurable with respect to the usual product σ-algebra I ⊗ F ,
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then the random variables fi are essentially constant for almost all i ∈ I (seeSun (2006,
Proposition 2.1 )). Consequently, the usual product probability space (I×Ω,I⊗F , λ⊗P )
will (typically) be inadequate to prove any meaningful result on no aggregate uncertainty.
As shown in Sun (2006), a simple way to resolve this problem is to work with an extension
of the usual product probability space that retains the Fubini property.
Definition 3.2.2. Let (I ×Ω,I ⊗F , λ⊗P ) be the usual product probability space of the
two probability spaces (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ). A probability space (I×Ω,W, Q) extending
(I ×Ω,I ⊗ F , λ⊗ P ) is said to be a Fubini extension if for any real-valued Q-integrable
function f on (I × Ω,W),
(1) the two functions fi and fω are integrable respectively on (Ω,F , P ) for λ-almost
all i ∈ I, and on (I,I, λ) for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω;
(2)
∫
Ω fi dP and
∫
I fω dP are integrable respectively on (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ), with∫













To reflect the fact that the probability space (I ×Ω,W, Q) has (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P )
as its marginal spaces, as required by the Fubini property, it will be denoted by (I×Ω,I⊠
F , λ⊠ P ).
Definition 3.2.3. A Fubini extension (I × Ω,W, Q) is said to be rich if there is a W-
measurable process G from I×Ω to the interval [0, 1], such that G is essentially pairwise
independent, and Gi induces the uniform distribution on [0, 1] for λ-almost all i ∈ I. We
say that such a rich Fubini extension is based on (I,I, λ), and the process G witnesses
the richness of the Fubini extension.
Indeed, a rich Fubini extension satisfies the universality property in the sense that
one can construct processes on it with essentially pairwise independent random variables
that have any given variety of distributions on a general Polish space. The following
4The classical Fubini Theorem is only stated for the usual product measure spaces. It does not apply
to integrable functions on (I × Ω,W, Q) since these functions may not be I ⊗ F-measurable. However,
the conclusions of that theorem do hold for processes on the enriched product space (I × Ω,W, Q) that
extends the usual product.
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result is Proposition 5.3 of Sun (2006). This result will be used in next section and
Chapter 4.
Lemma 3.2.4. Given a rich Fubini extension (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) and a Polish s-
pace X. Let φ be a measurable mapping from (I,I, λ) to M(X), then there exists an
I ⊠ F-measurable process f : I × Ω → X such that the process f is essentially pairwise
independent and φ(i) is the induced distribution by fi, for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
A desirable result for individual risk is its cancelation at the aggregate level. That is,
aggregation over a non-negligible group of agents leads to no uncertainty. The following
is a formal definition of coalitional aggregate certainty.
Definition 3.2.5. Let f be a process from I×Ω to a Polish space X. For any coalition S
(i.e., S ∈ I with λ(S) > 0), let fS be the restriction of f to S×Ω, IS = {C ∈ I : C ⊆ S},
and λS the probability measure rescaled from the restrictions of λ to IS. The process f is
said to satisfy the property of coalitional aggregate certainty if for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω,







S for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
When X is the real line R and the random variables fi are i.i.d. with a common
distribution function F , coalitional aggregate certainty means that for each coalition S,
the empirical distribution function FSω generated by the restricted sample function f
S
ω is
F for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. It is easy to construct examples of a continuum of independent
random variables with this aggregation property for the grand coalition I or for all the
coalitions; see the discussion in Sun (2006, Section 6.3), and Anderson (1991), Green
(1994), Judd (1985). However, one can also construct other examples of a continuum of
independent random variables whose sample functions may not be measurable, or behave
in a very “strange” way. In fact, for an i.i.d. process based on the usual continuum
product via the Kolmogorov construction, one can obtain the absurd claim that almost
all sample functions are essentially equal to an arbitrarily given function h on the index
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space (see Sun 2006, Proposition 6.1); and thus, the sample distribution can be undefined
or completely arbitrary (see also Doob 1937 and Judd 1985).
The following result is shown in Sun (2006, Theorem 2.8). It indicates that the
framework of Fubini extension does deliver the desired exact law of large numbers which
guarantees the cancelation of individual risk at the aggregate level.
Lemma 3.2.6. Let f be a measurable process from a Fubini extension (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P )
to a Polish space X. Then f satisfies the property of coalitional aggregate certainty if
and only if f is essentially pairwise independent.
The following is another version of the exact law of large numbers in terms of sample
means (see Sun 2006, Corollary 2.10). It follows from Lemma 3.2.6 immediately.
Corollary 3.2.7. Let f be an real-valued integrable process on (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ). If
the process f is essentially pairwise independent, then the sample mean Efω =
∫
I fωdλ
is the same as the mean of the process f , Ef =
∫
I×Ω f dλ⊠ P , for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
3.3 Main Results
Let I = [0, 1], L the σ-algebra of Lebesgue measurable sets, and η the Lebesgue measure
defined on L. The Lebesgue unit interval is simply (I,L, η). The unit interval and
the class of Lebesgue measurable sets with the Lebesgue measure provide the archetype
for models of games and economies with a continuum of agents, an interesting question
arises as to whether or not the the measure space (I,I, λ) in the statement of Lemma
3.2.4 can be chosen to be the Lebesgue space (I,L, η). Unfortunately, this is not possible
since the set of those ω ∈ Ω for which the associated sample function fω is L-measurable
has P -measure zero, contradicting part (1) of Definition 3.2.2 (for details, see Sun 2006,
Corollary 4.3). However, it may still be possible to choose some extension (I,I, λ) of
the Lebesgue unit interval (I,L, η) so that L ⊆ I and the restriction of λ to L coincides
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with η. Loosely speaking, this enriched space of agents would allow for more coalitions
to form.
We are now ready to state the main result of this chapter, some extension (I,I, λ) of
the Lebesgue unit interval (I,L, η) can be used as the agent space modeling a continuum
of agents with individual risk in a very general setting. In particular, we show the
existence of essentially pairwise independent processes measurable in a Fubini extension,
where the sample functions are measurable with respect to the extended Lebesgue interval
(I,I, λ) and the random variables can take any given variety of distributions. That is, we
require the probability space (I,I, λ) in Lemma 3.2.4 to be an extension of the Lebesgue
unit interval.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let I be the unit interval [0, 1] and X be a Polish space. There exists a
probability space (I,I, λ) extending the Lebesgue unit interval (I,L, η), a probability space
(Ω,F , P ), and a Fubini extension (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) such that for any measurable
mapping ϕ from (I,I, λ) to the space M(X) of Borel probability measures on X, there
is a I ⊠ F-measurable process f from I × Ω to X such that the random variables fi are
essentially pairwise independent, and the distribution Pf−1i is the given distribution ϕ(i)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
The following corollary on the special case of an i.i.d. process is obvious.
Corollary 3.3.2. Let I and X be as in Theorem 3.3.1. There exists a probability space
(I,I, λ) extending the Lebesgue unit interval, a probability space (Ω,F , P ), and a Fubini
extension (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ) such that for any Borel probability measure τ on X, there
is a I ⊠ F-measurable process f from I × Ω to X such that the random variables fi are
essentially pairwise independent with common distribution τ .
Remark 3.3.3. By Lemma 3.2.6, essential pairwise independence implies coalitional
aggregate certainty. Thus the processes in Theorem 3.3.1 and Corollary 3.3.2 satisfy
coalitional aggregate certainty. For the special case that X is the real line R and the
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random variables fi are i.i.d. with a common distribution function F as in Corollary 3.3.2,
we obtain that for each coalition S, the empirical distribution function FSω generated by
the restricted sample function fSω is F for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, the type of result
as mentioned in Feldman and Gilles (1985, Section 1) holds for some extension of the
Lebesgue unit interval.
Remark 3.3.4. In applications, it is often assumed that the measure space of agents
(A,A, α) is “isomorphic” to the measure space (I,L, η) in the sense that there exists a
bi-measurable bijection Θ : I → A of I = [0, 1] onto A such that α = ηΘ−1.5 Let (I,I, λ)
be the probability space in Theorem 3.3.1. Define a new probability space (I ′,I ′, λ′) by
letting I ′ = A, I ′ = {S′ ⊆ I ′ : Θ−1(S′) ∈ I}, and λ′(S′) = λ[Θ−1(S′)] for S′ ∈ I ′. Then,
Θ is an isomorphism not only between the probability spaces (I,L, η) and (A,A, α)
but also between the probability spaces (I,I, λ) and (I ′,I ′, λ′). Hence, (I ′,I ′, λ′) is an
extension of (A,A, α) (i.e., A ⊆ I ′ and the restriction of λ′ to A coincides with α).
We note that Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 3.5.2 below shows that one can move
from one Fubini extension to another by replacing the relevant parameter space using an
isomorphism of measure spaces. Exactly the same argument over there can be used to
prove that Theorem 3.3.1 remains true if (I,I, λ) is replaced by (I ′,I ′, λ′) which is now
an extension of (A,A, α).
3.4 Discussions: Saturation and Rich Fubini Extensions
In our main theorem 3.3.1, we should that an extension of the Lebesgue probability space
could serve as the index space in a rich Fubini extension. Notice that, such extension is
a saturated probability space. Actually, the saturation property plays a vital role in rich
Fubini extensions, namely, in modeling the index spaces in rich Fubini extension.
In literature, there are many successful constructions of rich Fubini extensions.Let
5This is the “standardness” assumption on some measure spaces. For example, an uncountable Polish
space with an atomless Borel probability measure has this property; see Royden (1968, Chapter 15).
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(I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) be a rich Fubini extension. If both (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ) are
atomless Loeb probability spaces, their Loeb product probability space is a rich Fubini
extension as shown in Theorem 6.2 of Sun (1998a). Sun (2006, Proposition 5.6) pro-
vides another construction, where I = [0, 1] and (I,I, λ) is a probability space obtained
from a hyperfinite Loeb counting space via a bijection, and (Ω,F , P ) is an extension of
the usual continuum product probability space (Ω,F ′, P ′). Based on the construction
of Sun (2006), in Theorem 3.3.1, we provide a new rich Fubini extension is presented
where (I,I, λ) is a saturated extension of the Lebesgue unit interval. Podczeck (2010)
establishes a more general result that (I,I, λ) could be any saturated probability space.
In particular,
Proposition 3.4.1. There exists a rich Fubini extension based on any saturated proba-
bility space.
Given a probability space (I,I, λ), let C be a countably generated sub-σ-algebra of I.
A measurable function f defined on the probability space (I,I, λ) is said to be essentially
C-measurable if there is a C-measurable function g also defined on I such that f(i) = g(i)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I. The following result is Theorem 4.2 of Sun (2006).
Lemma 3.4.2. Let F be an essentially pairwise independent process from (I×Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠
P ) to a Polish space X, and C a countably generated sub-σ-algebra of I. Then the set
of all ω ∈ Ω such that the function Fω is essentially C-measurable must have probability
zero except for the trivial case that almost all the random variables Fi are constant.
The next result says that, the existence of a rich Fubini extension based on a proba-
bility space is a characterization of the saturation property as in Keisler and Sun (2009).
It is straightforward from Lemmas 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
Theorem 3.4.3. The probability space (I,I, λ) is saturated if and only if there is a rich
Fubini extension based on it.
38 Chapter 3. Rich Fubini Extension with Lebesgue Extension Agent Spaces
Proof: By Proposition 3.4.1, the saturation property implies the existence of a rich
Fubini extension based on a probability space.
We next prove the converse. For the rich Fubini extension based on the probability
space (I,I, λ), assume that the process π witnesses the richness. That is, π is an es-
sentially pairwise independent process and the random variable πi induces the uniform
distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Note that this process π is nontrivial. By Lemma 3.4.2,
(I,I, λ) can not be countably generated. Suppose not, assume that (I,I, λ) is countably
generated. According to Lemma 3.4.2, for P -almost all ω, the sample function πω is
not I-measurable, which contradicts Assertion (1) of Definition 3.2.2 (A). Analogously,
for any subset S ∈ I with λ(S) > 0, notice that the restriction of the process π to
S × Ω is also a nontrivial essentially pairwise independent process, then (IS ,IS , λS) is
not countably generated either. Therefore the probability space (I,I, λ) is saturated by
Definition 2.1.2. 
3.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
In this appendix, the unit interval [0, 1] will have a different notation in a different
context. Recall that (I,L, η) is the Lebesgue unit interval. We shall often work with the
case that the target space X is the unit interval [0, 1] with uniform distribution µ. Here
µ is simply the Lebesgue measure defined on the Borel σ-algebra B of [0, 1]. Note that
the Lebesgue measure defined on the Lebesgue σ-algebra L is denoted by η.
The following result is (Sun, 2006, Proposition 5.6).
Lemma 3.5.1. Let K = [0, 1], there is a probability structure (K,K, κ) based on which
there is a rich Fubini extension. That is, there is a probability space (Ω,F , P ), a Fubini
extension (K ×Ω,K⊠F , κ⊠P ), and a K⊠F-measurable process g from K ×Ω to [0, 1]
such that the random variables gk are pairwise independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) with common uniform distribution µ on [0, 1].
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In addition, in Proposition 5.6 of Sun (2006), the sample probability space (Ω,F , P )
is an extension of the usual continuum product; the index space (K,K, κ) is obtained
from a Loeb probability space via a bijection. As shown in Corollary 3 of Keisler and Sun
(2001), (K,K, κ) is not an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval (I,L, η). However, as
mentioned earlier, the purpose of this paper is to obtain some extension of the Lebesgue
unit interval as an agent space with various desirable properties associated with individ-
ual risk.
In the following, we will work with the Lebesgue extension (I,I, λ) constructed in
Section 2.2.1 where (K,K, κ) is the space in Lemma 3.5.1. Notice that the Lebesgue
extension is a saturated probability space.
To prove Theorem 3.3.1, the key part is to construct a Fubini extension and essentially
pairwise independent measurable processes whose random variables take any variety of
distributions. We shall first consider a special case of Theorem 3.3.1 below.
Proposition 3.5.2. There is a rich Fubini extension based on (I,I, λ). In particular,
there is a Fubini extension (I ×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ) and an essentially pairwise independent
process f : I × Ω → [0, 1] such that f is I ⊠ F-measurable, and for each i ∈ I, the
distribution of the random variable fi is the uniform distribution µ on [0, 1].
Proof: We construct the process f : I ×Ω→ [0, 1] in three steps.
Step 1. Based on the process g and the Fubini extension (K × Ω,K ⊠ F , κ ⊠ P ) in
Lemma 3.5.1, we construct a new process G from the triple product space I × K × Ω
to [0, 1] with G(l, k, ω) = g(k, ω) for each (l, k, ω) ∈ I × K × Ω. Here the index space
is augmented to the usual product space (I ×K,L ⊗ K, η ⊗ κ) while the sample space
remains (Ω,F , P ).
For each (l, k) ∈ I × K, G(l,k) = gk is a random variable on the sample space with
common uniform distribution µ on [0, 1]. Moreover, the process G is essentially pairwise
independent. In fact, for any (l0, k0) ∈ I × K, if k 6= k0, gk0 and gk are independent
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random variables, so are the random variables G(l0,k0) = gk0 and G(l,k) = gk. It is obvious
that the subset {(l, k) ∈ I ×K : k 6= k0} has full η ⊗ κ-measure.
Now consider the usual product space (I ×K × Ω,L ⊗ (K ⊠ F), η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )) of the
Lebesgue unit interval (I,L, η) with the Fubini extension (K × Ω,K ⊠ F , κ ⊠ P ). Note
that the process G is L⊗ (K⊠F)-measurable because g is K⊠F-measurable. Next we
claim that it is a Fubini extension of the usual triple product space ((I ×K) × Ω, (L ⊗
K)⊗F), (η ⊗ κ)⊗ P ).
To show the Fubini property on the extended space, we adapt a proof analogous to
the usual Fubini Theorem.6 Let V ⊆ L1(η ⊗ (κ ⊠ P )) be the set of all η ⊗ (κ ⊠ P )-
integrable function h satisfying the Fubini property. That is, (1) h(l,k) is integrable on
(Ω,F , P ) for η⊗κ-almost all (l, k) ∈ I ×K and hω is integrable on (I ×K,L⊗K, η⊗κ)




I×K hωdη⊗ κ are integrable respectively on
(I×K,L⊗K, η⊗κ) and (Ω,F , P ); (3)
∫









I×K hω dη ⊗ κ)dP.
We shall first show that the set V contains all the indicator functions of the measur-
able sets in L ⊗ (K ⊠ F). Let D be the collection of all L ⊗ (K ⊠ F)-measurable sets D
such that its indicator function 1D (which takes value 1 in D and 0 outside) is in V .
Consider D to be a measurable rectangle B ×W for B ∈ L and W ∈ K ⊠ F . The
section Dω is B ×Wω. By the Fubini property associated with κ ⊠ P , B ×Wω is in
L ⊗K for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. The measure of Dω is η ⊗ κ(Dω) = η(B)κ(Wω), which is
P -integrable with integral η(B)
∫
Ω κ(Wω) dP . Similarly, the section D(l,k) is Wk if l ∈ B,
and empty if l /∈ B, which is in F for κ-almost all k ∈ K. The measure of D(l,k) is
1B(l)P (Wk), which is η ⊗ κ-integrable with integral η(B)
∫
K P (Wk)dκ. By the Fubini
6See, for example, (Royden, 1968, p. 308). Similar adaption of the idea has been used in
Hammond and Sun (2006) to prove the one-way Fubini property.
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property associated with κ⊠ P again,
∫
Ω
η(B)κ(Wω) dP = η(B)
∫
Ω
κ(Wω) dP = η(B)
∫
K




η ⊗ κ(Dω) dP =
∫
I×K
P (D(l,k)) dη ⊗ κ = (η ⊗ (κ⊠ P ))(D).
Hence, B ×W ∈ D.
Next, we show that the collection D is also a Dynkin (or λ-) system on I ×K × Ω.
Indeed, it is obvious that (i) I × K × Ω ∈ D; (ii) if D,D′ ∈ D and D′ ⊆ D, then
D − D′ ∈ D because 1D−D′ = 1D − 1D′ and Fubini property is closed under linear
combination; (iii) if Dn is an increasing sequence of sets in D, then 1Dn is an increasing
sequence of functions with limit 1∪∞n=1Dn , thus ∪
∞
n=1D
n ∈ D according to the Monotone
Convergence Theorem (see the proof for a general sequence of functions below). Since
the collection of measurable rectangles of the form B ×W for B ∈ L and W ∈ K ⊠ F is
a π-system (i.e., closed under finite intersections) and generates L ⊗ (K ⊠ F), Dynkin’s
π-λ Theorem (see p. 277 of Aliprantis and Border 1994 or p. 24 of Durrett 2005) implies
that D = L ⊗ (K ⊠ F). Hence V contains all the indicator functions of the measurable
sets in L ⊗ (K ⊠ F).
As mentioned above, the set V is closed under linear combinations. In particular, V
contains all the measurable simple functions and the difference between any two members.
Note that each η⊗(κ⊠P )-integrable function is the difference between two non-negative
integrable functions and each non-negative integrable function is the pointwise limit of
an increasing sequence of non-negative simple functions. So we only need to show that
for any increasing sequence of non-negative functions in V with an integrable pointwise
limit, the limit function also belongs to V .
Now let h ∈ L1(η⊗ (κ⊠P )), and {hn}∞n=1 be an increasing sequence of non-negative
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functions in V with pointwise limit h (to be denoted by hn ↑ h). By the Monotone





hn d (η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )) =
∫
I×K×Ω
hd (η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )).
Since hn satisfies the Fubini property, we know that hnω is η ⊗ κ-integrable for P -almost
all ω ∈ Ω. For each ω ∈ Ω, hnω ↑ hω. The Monotone Convergence Theorem implies that




ω dη ⊗ κ ↑
∫






ω dη ⊗ κ is P -integrable. Hence, the Monotone Convergence Theorem can






































hd (η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )).
The other half of the Fubini property for h can be proved in a similar way. Hence h ∈ V .
Therefore, we show that V = L1(η⊗ (κ⊠P )), which means that the extended space
(I ×K × Ω,L ⊗ (K ⊠ F), η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )) is a Fubini extension.
Step 2. Now consider a new process F from C ×Ω to [0, 1] with F being the restriction
G|C×Ω of G to C × Ω, where G is the process in Step 1. The index probability space is
restricted to (C,T , γ) from the the product space (I ×K,L⊗K, η ⊗ κ), and the sample
space (Ω,F , P ) remains the same as in Step 1.
It is clear that for any (l, k) ∈ C, F(l,k) is a random variable on the sample space
with uniform distribution µ on [0, 1]. Moreover, F is an essentially pairwise independent
process. In fact, for any (l0, k0) ∈ C ⊆ I ×K, the random variables F(l,k) = G(l,k) and
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F(l0,k0) = G(l0,k0) are independent for any (l, k) ∈ {(l, k) ∈ I×K : k 6= k0}∩C, note that
γ[{(l, k) ∈ I ×K : k 6= k0} ∩C] = η ⊗ κ[{(l, k) ∈ I ×K : k 6= k0}] = 1.
Recall that (I ×K ×Ω,L⊗ (K⊠F), η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )) is shown to be a Fubini extension
in Step 1. We shall prove that C ×Ω has η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )-outer measure one. Let D be any
measurable set in L ⊗ (K ⊠ F) that contains C × Ω. Then, for each ω ∈ Ω, C ⊆ Dω.
By the Fubini property associated with η ⊗ (κ ⊠ P ), we have for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω,
Dω ∈ L ⊗ K, and hence η ⊗ κ(Dω) = 1 since C has η ⊗ κ-outer measure one. By the
Fubini property associated with η⊗(κ⊠P ) again, η⊗(κ⊠P )(D) =
∫
Ω η⊗κ(Dω) dP = 1.
Based on the Fubini extension (I×K×Ω,L⊗ (K⊠F), η⊗ (κ⊠P )), we can construct
a measure structure on C×Ω as follows. Let E = {D∩(C×Ω) : D ∈ L⊗(K⊠F)} (which
is a σ-algebra on C × Ω), and ν be the set function on E defined by ν(D ∩ (C × Ω)) =
η ⊗ (κ ⊠ P )(D) for any measurable set D in L ⊗ (K ⊠ F). Then, ν is a well-defined
probability measure on (C × Ω, E) since the η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )-outer measure of C ×Ω is one.
It is obvious that the process F is E-measurable.
Next, we show that the probability space (C × Ω, E , ν) extends the usual product
probability space (C × Ω,T ⊗ F , γ ⊗ P ). Fix any Y ∈ T and A ∈ F . Then, there is a
measurable set U ∈ L⊗K such that Y = U∩C. The rectangle Y ×A is (U×A)∩(C×Ω);
and hence it belongs to E . By the definitions of γ and ν, we know that
(γ ⊗ P )(Y ×A) = γ(Y ) · P (A) = (η ⊗ κ)(U) · P (A) = (η ⊗ κ⊗ P )(U ×A)
= η ⊗ (κ⊠ P )(U ×A) = ν[(U ×A) ∩ (C × Ω)] = ν(Y ×A).
Since E contains all the rectangles Y ×A for Y ∈ T and A ∈ F (which generate T ⊗F), it
contains T ⊗F . Since the probability measures (γ⊗P ) and ν agree on all the rectangles
Y ×A for Y ∈ T and A ∈ F (which generate T ⊗F and form a π-system), the theorem
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on the uniqueness of measure (p. 404 of Durrett 2005) implies that (γ ⊗ P ) and ν must
agree on T ⊗ F . Therefore, (C × Ω, E , ν) is an extension of (C × Ω,T ⊗ F , γ ⊗ P ).
In the following, we shall show that (C × Ω, E , ν) is a Fubini extension. Fix any
measurable set E ∈ E . Then, E = D ∩ (C × Ω) for some D ∈ L ⊗ (K ⊠ F). For
each ω ∈ Ω, Eω = Dω ∩ C. By the Fubini property associated with η ⊗ (κ ⊠ P ),
we have for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, Dω is in L ⊗ K, which means that Eω ∈ T with
γ(Eω) = η⊗ κ(Dω). By the same Fubini property again, η⊗ κ(Dω) is P -integrable with
integral
∫
Ω η⊗κ(Dω)dP = η⊗ (κ⊠P )(D). Hence,
∫
Ω γ(Eω) dP = η⊗ (κ⊠P )(D), which
implies that
∫
Ω γ(Eω) dP = ν(E) by the definition of ν.
Next we shall prove the other part of the Fubini property associated with ν for the
measurable set E ∈ E . Recall that ν(E) = η ⊗ (κ ⊠ P )(D). By the Fubini property
associated with η ⊗ (κ ⊠ P ), the function P (D(l,k)) on I × K is integrable over (I ×
K,L ⊗K, η⊗κ) with integral η⊗(κ⊠P )(D) =
∫
I×K P (D(l,k)) d η⊗κ. Since (I×K,U , γ)
is an extension of (I × K,L ⊗K, η ⊗ κ), P (D(l,k)) is integrable over (I × K,U , γ) with∫
I×K P (D(l,k)) d γ =
∫
I×K P (D(l,k)) d η⊗κ. Since C ∈ U with measure γ(C) = 1 and T
is the restriction of U to C, the restriction of P (D(l,k)) to C is integrable over (C,T , γ)
with
∫
C P (D(l,k)) dγ =
∫
I×K P (D(l,k)) d γ. Since E(l,k) = D(l,k) for any (l, k) ∈ C, we
know that P (E(l,k)) is integrable over (C,T , γ) with
∫
C P (E(l,k)) dγ =
∫
C P (D(l,k)) dγ.
By combining all these equalities together, we obtain that ν(E) =
∫
C P (E(l,k)) dγ.
Therefore the indicator function 1E satisfies the Fubini property for any measurable
set E ∈ E . The rest of the proof of the Fubini property is the same as in Step 1. Thus
the probability space (C×Ω, E , ν) is a Fubini extension of the usual product probability
space (C × Ω,T ⊗ F , γ ⊗ P ).
Step 3. Now let f : I × Ω→ [0, 1] be another process defined by f(i, ω) = F (ξ−1(i), ω)
for any (i, ω) ∈ I × Ω, where F is the process in Step 2 and ξ the isomorphism between
the probability spaces (C,T , γ) and (I,I, λ). It is clear that the process f is essentially
pairwise independent and the random variable fi has uniform distribution µ on [0, 1] for
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any i ∈ I.
Given the Fubini extension (C ×Ω, E , ν) of the usual product probability space (C ×
Ω,T ⊗F , γ⊗P ) in Step 2, we can use the bijection (ξ, IdΩ) from C×Ω to I×Ω to construct
a σ-algebra W = {H ⊆ I × Ω : (ξ, IdΩ)
−1(H) ∈ E} on I × Ω, where IdΩ is the identity
map on Ω. Define a probability measure ρ on W by letting ρ(H) = ν[(ξ, IdΩ)
−1(H)]
for any H ∈ W. Therefore, (ξ, IdΩ) is also an isomorphism between the two probability
spaces (C × Ω, E , ν) and (I × Ω,W, ρ). The process f is obviously W-measurable.
For S ∈ I and Y ∈ F , the definition of I implies that ξ−1(S) ∈ T , and hence
(ξ, IdΩ)
−1(S ×Y ) ∈ T ⊗F ⊆ E . Therefore, the definition of W implies that S ×Y ∈ W.
By the definition of ρ,
ρ(S × Y ) = ν[(ξ, IdΩ)
−1(S × Y )] = ν[ξ−1(S)× Y ] = γ ⊗ P [ξ−1(S)× Y ]
= γ[ξ−1(S)] · P (Y ) = λ(S)P (Y ) = λ⊗ P (S × Y ).
The probability measures ρ and λ ⊗ P agree on all the rectangles S × Y for S ∈ I and
Y ∈ F , which generate I ⊗ F and form a π-system. As in Step 2, the theorem on the
uniqueness of measure (Durrett 2005, p. 404) implies that (λ⊗ P ) and ρ must agree on
I ⊗ F . Therefore, (I × Ω,W, ρ) is an extension of (I ×Ω,I ⊗ F , λ⊗ P ).
Next, we prove the Fubini property associated with ρ. As in Step 2, we only prove
this property for any measurable set H ∈ W. Let E = (ξ, IdΩ)−1(H); then E ∈ E and
ν(E) = ν[(ξ, IdΩ)
−1(H)] = ρ(H).
It is obvious that for any ω ∈ Ω, ξ−1(Hω) = Eω, and Hω = ξ(Eω). By the definition
of λ, λ(Hω) = γ[ξ
−1(Hω)] = γ(Eω). By the Fubini property associated with ν for
E, for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, Eω ∈ T , and thus it follows from the definition of I that
Hω = ξ(Eω) ∈ I. By the Fubini property associated with ν for E again, the P -integrable
function γ(Eω) has integral ν(E) =
∫
Ω γ(Eω) dP . Since ρ(H) = ν(E), we have ρ(H) =∫
Ω λ(Hω) dP .
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For the other part of the Fubini property associated with ρ for H, note that Hi =
Eξ−1(i) for each i ∈ I. By the Fubini property of ν for E, there is a set T ∈ T with
γ(T ) = 1 such that for any (l, k) ∈ T , E(l,k) ∈ F . Hence, ξ(T ) ∈ I with λ(ξ(T )) = 1,
and for each i ∈ ξ(T ), Hi = Eξ−1(i) ∈ F . By the Fubini property of ν for E and the




P (E(l,k)) dγ =
∫
T











Since ρ(H) = ν(E), we have ρ(H) =
∫
I P (Hi) dλ.
Therefore, (I × Ω,W, ρ) is a Fubini extension. As in Definition 3.2.2, we denote
(I × Ω,W, ρ) by (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠ P ).
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1: It is now obvious that Theorem 3.3.1 follows from Lemma




The idea of purification, i.e., elimination of randomness, is important in game theory and
statistical decision theory. Theorem 4 of Dvorestky, Wald and Wolfwitz (1951a) (DWW
Theorem for short), which is a generalization of the celebrated theorem of Lyapunov for
vector measures, plays a central role. In particular, it says that corresponding to any
mixed strategy with finite actions, there exists a pure strategy with identical integrals
with respect to a finite set of atomless measures on a measurable space. Here the pure
strategy is called a purification of the mixed strategy.
Many results on pure strategy Nash equilibria for atomless games with finite ac-
tions can simply viewed as the application of DWW’s theorem. Dvorestzky et al.
(1950, 1951b) establish the purification results for statistical decision procedures, and
for mixed strategies in two person zero-sum games with finite actions. The relevance
of DWW Theorem to purification results in finite-player games with finite actions and
with diffused, incomplete information is suggested by Radner and Rosenthal (1982) and
Milgrom and Weber (1985).1 In these games, each equilibrium in mixed strategy has a
1See Radner and Rosenthal (1982, Footnote 3) and Milgrom and Weber (1985, Section 5).
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payoff equivalent or distribution equivalent purification. A unified approach by apply-
ing DWW Theorem to purification problems in games with finite players is presented
in Khan et al. (2006). More precisely, Khan et al. establish a stronger purification result
that, in the above games with diffused and incomplete information, any mixed strategy
(not necessarily an equilibrium) has a strong purification (see Definition 5.2.5 below).
In addition, Khan et al. establish the existence of purification for any mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium in a large non-anonymous game as in Schmeidler (1973),2 and the ex-
istence of symmetrization for an equilibrium distribution in a large anonymous game as
in Mas-Colell (1984) and Khan and Sun (1991).
DWW Theorem has been generalized in several ways. Edwards (1987) shows that
DWW Theorem still holds for a countable infinite action space without any additional
assumptions; see also Khan and Rath (2009) for an elementary proof. In the context of
uncountable action spaces, Loeb and Sun (2006) show a generalization of DWW Theorem
by working with atomless Loeb measure spaces instead of atomless measure spaces. As
motivated by the general technique in Keisler and Sun (2009), see Section 1.1, a more
general version of DWW Theorem is presented in Podczeck (2009) and Loeb and Sun
(2009), where atomless Loeb measure spaces are replaced by saturated probability spaces.
Moreover, the saturation property is also a necessary framework in the sense that the
general DWW Theorem is valid on any saturated probability space and invalid on any
non-saturated probability space.
In this chapter, we present a general purification theorem on saturated probability
spaces (see Theorem 4.2.1 below), which provides a far reaching generalization of the
earlier purification results. Our proof is built heavily on the ELLN systematically studied
in Sun (1998a, 2006) (see also Section 3.2). This approach is different from the techniques
used in Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009) and Podczeck (2009).
2See Rath (1992) for a direct proof of the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games
when the action space is any compact subset in Rn.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The main results are presented in
Section 4.2, and proved in Section 4.3. Finally, some remarks and comments are provided
in Section 4.4.
4.2 Main Results
In this section, we fix a saturated probability space (I,I, λ), and a rich Fubini extension
(I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) (see Section 3.2). Let X be a Polish space associated with BX
andM(X). For any I-measurable mapping f from (I,I, λ) to M(X), let f(i;B) be the
value of the probability measure f(i) for any Borel subset B ⊆ X. Denote by f(i; dx)
the integration operator with respect to this probability measure f(i).
Let H be the collection of real-valued functions φ on the product space I ×X such
that: (1) φ is I ⊗ BX-measurable, and (2) φ is integrally bounded, i.e., there exists
a nonnegative integrable function αφ from (I,I, λ) to R with |φ(i, x)| ≤ αφ(i) for all
(i, x) ∈ I ×X.
We are ready to introduce our main result, which is a general purification theorem.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let (I×Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠P ) be a rich Fubini extension based on a saturated
probability space (I,I, λ). Assume X is a Polish space, and D a countable subset of H.
Then for any I-measurable mapping f : I → M(X), there exists an I ⊠ F-measurable
process F : I × Ω→ X with the following properties.
(1) The process F is essentially pairwise independent and the induced distribution on
X of Fi is f(i) for λ-almost all i.
(2) For P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, the mapping Fω : I → X is a purification for f with





φ(i, x) f(i; dx) dλ(i) =
∫
I
φ[i, Fω(i)] dλ(i). (4.1)
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We can interpret Theorem 4.2.1 in a decision-making situation. Suppose Ann is the
decision maker with the space of uncertainty, (I,I). She can choose an action from the
space X and her payoff function is taken from D. Assume further that before making an
decision, she has no information about the uncertainty except the distribution λ, which
is a probability measure on (I,I). Her objective is to maximize the expected payoff by
choosing a mixed strategy f : I → M(X). That is, her action is a probability measure
on the action space X when facing the uncertainty i.
In Theorem 4.2.1, what is the role played by the probability space (Ω,F , P )? This
space works as a random device for the decision maker. When facing the uncertainty
i, Ann can choose actions with the assistance of this probability space. In particular,
she takes the action Fi(ω) when ω is realized. In this way, she takes a pure strategy
Fω : (I,I, λ) → X when ω is realized. We call F : (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) → X a
behaviorial strategy.3 Assertion (1) in Theorem 4.2.1 says that for Fi defined on the
probability space (Ω,F , P ) induces the same distribution as f(i) for λ-almost all i. That
is, with the assistance of the random device, the decision maker can implement her mixed
strategy f by taking the behaviorial strategy F .
Next we say something about the property of essentially pairwise independence. Since
(I,I, λ) is interpreted the space of uncertainty, the independence condition could model
the situation that the decision maker takes actions independently when facing different
uncertainty, provided that the information structure is sufficiently “rich”. In the theory
of large games, (I,I, λ) is used to represent the space of names of the players. The
independence property is natural since different players take actions independently.4
Under the assumption that the process F is essentially pairwise independent, by
the ELLN, Assertion (2) in Theorem 4.2.1 implies that almost every Fω is a required
purification. More precisely, for almost any ω ∈ Ω, by taking the pure strategy Fω,
3See Khan et al. (2006) for more discussion about mixed strategies and behaviorial strategies.
4See Khan and Sun (2002) for a survey on games with many players.
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Ann can earn the amount of
∫
I φ[i, Fω(i)] dλ(i), and this amount is exactly the same




X φ(i, x) f(i; dx) dλ(i). In
other words, the risk about how much she can earn under different realizations of ω ∈ Ω
disappears.
The next result is a generalization of Khan et al. (2006, Corollary 1), which in turn
is a generalization of the original DWW Theorem in Dvorestzky et al. (1951a). It
follows from Theorem 4.2.1 line by line as Loeb and Sun (2006, Corollary 2.4) follows
from Loeb and Sun (2006, Theorem 2.2).
Corollary 4.2.2. Let (I×Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠P ) be a rich Fubini extension based on a saturated
probability space (I,I, λ). Let X be a Polish space. For each k in a countable set K, let
µk be a finite signed measure on (I,I) that is absolutely continuous with respect to λ.
For each j in a countable set J , assume that φj ∈ H.
Then for any I-measurable mapping f from I to M(X), there exists an I ⊠ F-
measurable process F : I × Ω → X, such that F is essentially pairwise independent,
the induced distribution of Fi is f(i) for λ-almost all i; and for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω the






φj(i, a) f(i; dx) dλ(i) =
∫
I




f(i;B) dµk(i) = µk[F
−1
ω (B)], for all B ∈ BX and k ∈ K;
3. Fω(i) ∈ supp f(i) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
In Corollary 4.2.2, let J be an empty set, the existence result of the above corollary is
a variation of the DWW theorem on a saturated probability space (I,I, λ) and a general
Polish space X. For another special case, taking J to be empty and the set K contains
only one element with µ1 = λ, the existence result of Corollary 4.2.2 is Keisler and Sun
(2009, Theorem 3.6 (P6)).
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Corollary 4.2.3. Let (I,I, λ) be a saturated probability space. For each k in a finite
or countably infinite set K, let µk be a finite signed measure on (I,I) that is absolutely
continuous with respect to µ. For each j in a countable set J , assume that φj ∈ H. If
f is a I-measurable mapping from I to M(X), then there is a I-measurable mapping g


















3. g(i) ∈ supp f(i) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
Let us first fix one φ ∈ D. Given the saturated probability space (I,I, λ), together
with the rich Fubini extension (I×Ω,I ⊠ F , P ). Since the measure-valued mapping f is
I-measurable, by Proposition 3.4.1 and Lemma 3.2.4, there exists an I ⊠ F-measurable
process F : I×Ω→ X, which is essentially pairwise independent and the random variable
Fi induces distribution f(i) for λ-almost all i ∈ I. Thus, we prove Assertion (1) in the
theorem.
We next show Assertion (2). Notice that Fi induces the distribution f(i) for λ-almost
all i, it follows that,
∫
X
φ(i, x) f(i; dx) =
∫
Ω











φ[i, F (i, ω)] dP (ω) dλ(i). (4.3)
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DefineGφ(i, ω) = φ[i, F (i, ω)]. We next show in two steps thatGφ is a λ⊠P -integrable
function. First, it is an I ⊠ F-measurable function on I×Ω. Towards this end, define H
to be a process from (I × Ω,I ⊠ F) to (I ×X,I ⊗ BX) by letting H(i, ω) = [i, F (i, ω)].
The mapping H is measurable. Indeed, for any Borel subset C ⊆ R, φ−1(C) ∈ I ⊗ BX
because φ is measurable, thenH−1[φ−1(C)] is I ⊠ F-measurable. Note that [Gφ]−1(C) =
H−1[φ−1(C)], we thus obtain the I ⊠ F -measurability of Gφ. Second, because φ(i, x) is
bounded by αφ(i) for any x ∈ X, so is Gφ(i, ω) = φ[i, F (i, ω)] for any ω ∈ Ω. Therefore,
we obtain the λ ⊠ P -integrability of Gφ, because the λ-integrable function αφ can also
be viewed as a λ⊠ P -integrable function on I × Ω.
Note that (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) is a Fubini extension of the product space between





φ[i, F (i, ω)] dP (ω) dλ(i) =
∫
I×Ω
Gφ dλ⊠ P. (4.4)
Moreover, we claim that Gφ is an essentially pairwise independent process. Given
any Borel subset C in R, φ−1i (C) ∈ BX due to the measurability of φ(i, ·) for λ-almost
all i ∈ I. Then for such an i, F−1i [φ
−1
i (C)] ∈ F since Fi is a F-measurable mapping.
It is clear that [Gφi ]
−1(C) = F−1i [φ
−1
i (C)], which implies that G
φ
i is F-measurable for
λ-almost all i ∈ I. Moreover, Gφi and G
φ
i′ are pairwise independent if Fi and Fi′ are
independent. Accordingly, the process Gφ is essentially pairwise independent because
the process F satisfies this property.
Now we are ready to apply the ELLN for the essentially pairwise independent process
Gφ. By Corollary 3.2.7, there exists a P -null subsetNφ ⊆ Ω, such that for any ω ∈ Ω\Nφ,
∫
I×Ω






φ[i, Fω(i)] dλ(i) (4.5)
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φ(i, x) f(i; dx) dλ(i) =
∫
I
φ[i, Fω(i)] dλ(i). (4.6)
We next fix such a P -null subset for each φ ∈ D. Now we can turn to the countable
subset D of H. Following the above procedure, we can construct a countable number




φ, it is clear that P (N) = 0. Hence, by Equation (4.6), we obtain that for





φ(i, x) f(i; dx) dλ(i) =
∫
I
φ[i, Fω(i)] dλ(i). (4.7)
Thus, the mapping Fω, for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, is a required purification of the measure-
valued one f with respect to φ ∈ D. We complete the proof of Assertion (2) of the
theorem. 
4.4 Discussions
In this chapter, besides establishing the existence result based on saturated probability
spaces as in Loeb and Sun (2009), Podczeck (2009), we can simultaneously obtain MANY
required purifications. More precisely, these purifications can be indexed by a full subset
in an atomless probability space (Ω,F , P ).
Recall that the probability space (Ω,F , P ) can represent all the mappings from I
to X. Assume that the measure-valued mapping f in nontrivial, i.e., it is not the case
that f(i) is a Dirac measure on X for λ-almost all i ∈ I. Accordingly, for the relevant
essentially pairwise independent process F , it is not the case that almost every Fi is
essentially a constant. Then there are many different ω ∈ Ω such that Fω are different
measurable mappings over (I,I, λ). Therefore, if f is nontrivial, we can simultaneously
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obtain many different purifications for f with respect to D.
We next compare our general purification result, Theorem 4.2.1, with the earlier
results in Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009) and Podczeck (2009). First, as to the methodol-
ogy, our result relies heavily on the ELLN. In comparison, the purification theorem of
Loeb and Sun (2006) is based on atomless Loeb probability spaces, and the authors make
use of techniques in nonstandard analysis. Loeb and Sun (2009) mainly apply techniques
introduced by Hoover and Keisler (1984) that certain types of results over one saturated
probability space can be transferred to another. Consequently, the existence result of pu-
rifications based on an atomless Loeb probability space, Loeb and Sun (2006, Theorem
2.2), can be transferred to the existence result based on a general saturated probability
space. In Podczeck (2009), new results on functional analysis are established to prove
the general purification theorem.
Second, in the earlier purification results, i.e., Loeb and Sun (2006, Theorem 2.2) and
Loeb and Sun (2009, Theorem 2.2), Podczeck (2009, Theorem 2), the target space X is
a compact metric space. While in our Theorem 4.2.1, we take X to be a more general
Polish space.
Third, in the earlier results, instead of functions in H, a more restrictive condition
is imposed on the functions over the product I × X. Let H′ denote the collection of
functions considered in Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009) and Podczeck (2009). Here H′ is the
collection of all the functions φ on I × X with the following conditions. (1a) φ(·, x)
is I-measurable on I for each x ∈ X, (1b) φ(i, ·) is continuous on X for each i ∈ I,
and (2) φ is bounded by a non-negative λ-integrable function αφ. Here the conditions
(1a) and (1b) are the Carathe´odory condition. It is known that any function satisfying
the Carathe´odory condition is also jointly measurable. As a result, H′ is a subset of H.
It is worthwhile to note that in Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009), Podczeck (2009), the
proofs of purification theorems therein depend on the setting that the target space is a
compact metric space and the functions satisfy the Carathe´odory condition. Thus, their
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methods cannot be applied to our setting in Theorem 4.2.1 directly.
Finally, it follows from Theorem 4.2.1 that the saturation property of a probabil-
ity space implies the existence of purification for any measure-valued mapping with a
general Polish action space. We note that the converse also holds. Specifically, as il-
lustrated by counterexamples in Loeb and Sun (2009, Remark 2.4) and Podczeck (2009,
Theorem 3(B)), if a probability space is not saturated, there exists a measure-valued
mapping, a function φ ∈ H, such that the purification does not exist.5
5For the counterexample in the special setting that the probability space is a Lebesgue space,
see Loeb and Sun (2006, Example 2.7). For a survey about similar counterexamples in the theory of
large games, see Khan and Sun (2002, Section 5).
Chapter 5
The Private Information Games
5.1 Introduction
Game theory is heavily shaped by the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium, either for
finite-player games with complete information or with incomplete information games.
Such a solution concept has long been criticized for lack of sufficient support from be-
havioral evidence in the real world. In this regard, a robust theory on the existence
of pure strategy equilibrium is demanded, if applicable. Indeed, in a general class of
private information games, if each player is to choose finite actions, together with the
diffuseness and independence assumptions on the private information structure, suitably
formalized, there does exist a pure strategy equilibrium, see Milgrom and Weber (1985),
Radner and Rosenthal (1982).
It is interesting to study whether such existence results of pure strategy equilibria in
Milgrom and Weber (1985), Radner and Rosenthal (1982) still hold in such games where
the action spaces are uncountably infinite. Nevertheless, the answer to this question is
negative. In 1999, Khan, Rath and Sun (1999) constructed a two-player game, each
player’s type is modeled by the Lebesgue unit interval, the action space is taken to
be the interval [−1, 1] and finally the payoff functions are well designed such that all
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the conditions in Milgrom and Weber (1985) are satisfied, however, there exists no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. To circumvent this non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium,
Khan and Sun (1996) established a robust theory that if the diffused information are
modeled by atomless Loeb probability spaces, there does exist a pure strategy equilibrium
in every such game with uncountably infinite action spaces.
Along this line of the literature, the modeling of the diffused information plays a cen-
tral rule to guarantee the existence of pure strategy equilibria in such private information
games. From the viewpoint, the above results can be translated as follows. For private
information games with uncountably infinite action spaces, the Lebesgue unit interval is
not an appropriate modeling to ensure us a pure strategy equilibrium. As a contrast, the
atomless Leob probability spaces work well. Note that nonstandard analysis is involved
when working with Loeb probability spaces. It is of interest to investigate whether such
desired results on existence of pure strategy equilibria can be obtained within the con-
ventional measure-theoretical framework. In other words, whether the Leob probability
space is a dispensable modeling of diffused information to guarantee the existence of pure
strategy equilibrium in such games with uncountably infinite action spaces?
In this chapter, we provide a complete answer to this question. First, we show that,
in a general theoretical model of private information games, if modeling the (marginal)
diffused information signals by saturated probability spaces, then there does exist a pure
strategy equilibrium. This result generalizes the existence result of Khan and Sun (1999)
since any atomless Loeb probability space is saturated, and not verse visa. Compared
to the negative results on Lebesgue spaces, the basic idea of our positive results is that
there are many more measurable subsets in saturated probability spaces than in Lebesgue
spaces. As a result, richness of diffused information allows players to make more and
detailed plans in the game, thus guarantee the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in
such private information games.
Second and more interestingly, the saturation property also furnishes a necessary
5.2 The Model 59
condition to model the diffused information in the sense that there always exists a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in such games. In particular, given that an information struc-
ture satisfies the moderate assumptions like conditional independence and diffuseness,
given the actions spaces to be uncountably infinite compact metric spaces, if there exists
a pure strategy equilibrium in every private information game with the given information
and action structures, then each player’s diffused information or types must be modeled
by a saturated probability space. Put it differently, in such a setting, if the private infor-
mation for some player is unsaturated, i.e., his or her information structure is not rich
enough (compared to a saturated information structure), this lack of saturation of the
private information structure leaves some room for some counterexample in which the
pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist. As far as our knowledge, this necessary
condition is new in literature.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the models of the pri-
vate information games, and establishes the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium.
In Section 5.3, we obtain the necessity of the saturation in the modeling of diffused
information. Some remarks and comments are presented in Section 5.4.
5.2 The Model
A game with private information Γ consists of a finite set of ℓ players and the following
associated spaces and functions. Each player i chooses actions from a compact metric
space Ai, and the product Π
ℓ
j=1Aj is denoted by A. For each player i, a measurable
space (Ti,Ti) represents the private information and events known to the player but
not necessarily to other players. A finite or countably infinite set T0 = {t0p : p ∈ P}
represents those states that are to be publicly announced to all the players; denote by T0
the power set of T0. Another finite or countably infinite set S0 = {s0q : q ∈ Q} represents
the payoff-relevant common states that affect the payoffs of all the players with S0 the
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power set of S0. The product measurable space (Ω,F) := (S0 × Π
ℓ
j=0Tj ,S0 × Π
ℓ
j=0Tj)
equipped with a probability measure µ constitutes the information space of the game Γ.
Let µ0 be the marginal probability measure on the countable set S0 × T0, and µi
the marginal probability measure on (Ti,Ti). For each given t0p ∈ T0 and s0q ∈ S0,
for simplicity, we denote µ0({(t0p, s0q)}) by αpq and without loss of generality, assume
that αpq > 0; let µ
pq denote the conditional probability measure of µ on the space
(Πℓj=1Tj ,Π
ℓ
j=1Tj). Such a conditional probability measure always exists since both S0
and T0 are countable. For each player i = 1, . . . , ℓ, let µ
pq
i be the respective marginal
measures of and µpq on the space (Ti,Ti).
Now for the principal result of this paper, we will need the following assumptions on
the information structure, (Ω,F , µ).
Assumption 5.2.1. Given the public and payoff-relevant common information for each




Assumption 5.2.2. The players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffused, that
is, the marginal measure µi on (Ti,Ti) is atomless for each player i.
Next we introduce the payoff functions. For each player i, his payoff depends on the
actions chosen by all the players, and a payoff relevant common state s0 ∈ S0, together
with his own private information ti ∈ Ti. That is, the i-th player’s payoff is given by a
function ui : A × S0 × Ti −→ R. We consider the following assumption for the payoff
functions.
Assumption 5.2.3. For each player i, (1) ui(·, s0, ti) is a continuous function on A when
s0 and ti are fixed; (2) for each a ∈ A and s0 ∈ S0, ui(a, s0, ·) is Ti-measurable on Ti; and
(3) there is an integrable function φ on (Ω,F , µ) such that for each payoff function ui,
|ui(a, s0, ti)| ≤ φ(s0, t0, t1, · · · , tℓ) holds for each a ∈ A, and each (s0, t0, t1, · · · , tℓ) ∈ Ω.
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In what follows, when i is given, we shall abbreviate a product over all indices 1 ≤
j ≤ ℓ except for j = i by Πj 6=i; i.e., Πj 6=i means Π1≤j≤ℓ,j 6=i. For each player i = 1, . . . , ℓ,
we shall use the following (conventional) notation: A−i = Πj 6=iAj . For a in the product
A = Πℓj=1Aj , we write a−i for the projection of a into A−i; we also denote a with the pair
(ai, a−i). Similarly, for a mixed strategy profile f = (f1, . . . , fℓ), we write f = (fi, f−i).
A mixed strategy for player i is a measurable mapping from her information space
(T0 × Ti,T0 ⊗ Ti) to M(Ai). A pure strategy is an T0 ⊗ Tn-measurable mapping from
T0×Ti to Ai, and it can be regarded as a mixed strategy using Dirac measures. A mixed
(pure) strategy profile f = (f1, · · · , fℓ) is a tuple of mixed (pure) strategies, in which fi
specifies a mixed (pure) strategy for player i. In the sequel, for each player i and t0, ti,
let fi(t0, ti; dai) denote the integration operator with respect to the Borel probability
measure fi(t0, ti). Given any mixed strategy profile f = (f1, · · · , fℓ), the corresponding






ui(a, s0, ti)f1(t0, t1; da1) · · · fℓ(t0, tℓ; daℓ) dµ(ω), (5.2)
where for each t0 ∈ T0 and ti ∈ Ti, the inner integral on A is the iterated integral on
Aℓ, · · · , A1 respectively. A mixed strategy profile f = (fi, f−i) is called a Nash equilibrium
for the game Γ if for every player i, Ui(fi, f−i) ≥ Ui(f
′




The following is about the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium for the game Γ,
which is Theorem 1 of Fu (2008).
Lemma 5.2.4. Supposed that Assumptions 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 hold, then there exists
a mixed strategy equilibrium for the game Γ.
Now following Khan et al. (2006), we define the concept of strong purification for our
game model.
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Definition 5.2.5. A pure strategy profile g = (g1, · · · , gℓ) is said to be a strong purifica-
tion of a mixed strategy profile f = (f1, · · · , fℓ) = (fi, f−i) if the following four conditions
are satisfied for each player i.
1. Ui(f) = Ui(g).
2. For any given mixed strategy f˜i of player i, Ui(f˜i, f−i) = Ui(f˜i, g−i).
3. For each p ∈ P and q ∈ Q, given t0 = t0p, s0 = s0q, gn(t0p, ·) and fn(t0p, ·) have the
same conditional distribution on An, i.e.,
∫
Ti
fi(t0p, ti; ·) dµ
pq





4. For all p and q ∈ Q, gi(t0p, ti) ∈ supp fi(t0p, ti) for µ
pq
i -almost all ti ∈ Ti.
Items 1 and 2 guarantee that if the mixed strategy f is a Nash equilibrium, so is its
strong purification, which is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Here is our first result.
Theorem 5.2.6. Supposed that Assumptions 5.2.1 and 5.2.3 hold, and for each player i,
the marginal private information space (Ti,Ti, µi) is a saturated probability space, then
there exists a strong purification for every mixed strategy in Γ; moreover, there exists a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Γ.
Proof: In what follows, we first show that for any mixed strategy in the game Γ satisfying
the conditions in the theorem, there exists a strong purification. Next, notice that a
saturated probability space is naturally an atomless probability space, Assumption 5.2.2
holds. It implies that there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Γ,
thus the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a result of the existence of the
strong purification of such a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
First fix player i. Notice that for any p ∈ P, q ∈ Q, µ0({(t0p, s0q)}) = αpq, then for






i (Si). Thus each µ
pq
i is absolutely continuous
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with respect to µi. According to the conditionally independence, Assumption 5.2.1, we




i for each p ∈ P, q ∈ Q.
For any mixed strategy profile f = (f1, · · · , fℓ), player i’s expected payoff Ui(f)
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ui(s0q, ti, ai, a−i) Πj 6=ifj(t0p, tj ; daj) Πj 6=idµ
pq
j (tj). (5.4)
For each j = 1, · · · , ℓ, let γ
fj
jpq be the induced probability distribution on Aj of∫
Tj
fj(t0p, ij , ·)dµ
pq




ui(s0q, ti, ai, a−i) dΠj 6=iγ
fj
jpq. (5.5)
Equations (5.3) and (5.5) imply that, given t0 = t0p, s0 = s0q, player i’s expected pay-
off depends on the actions of the other players only through the induced conditional
distributions of their strategies on their action spaces.
Since for each player i, ui satisfies Assumption 5.2.3, it is clear that for each p, q,
vfipq(ti, ai) satisfies the following conditions: (1) for any fixed ti, v
f
ipq(ti, ·) is continuous
in Ai, (2) for any fixed ai, v
f
ipq(·, ai) is Ti-measurable on Ti, and (3) since |ui(a, s0, ti)|
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φ(s0q, t0p, t1, · · · , tl)Πj 6=idµ
pq
j (tj),
the right side is a µi-integrable function.




i }q∈Q, Ai, {v
f
ipq}q∈Q, fi(t0p, ·)}





























(iii) gpi (ti) ∈ supp f(t0p, ti) for µi-almost all ti ∈ Ti.
Since here we choose i and p arbitrarily, the above arguments hold for all i = 1, · · · , ℓ
and p ∈ P . Let gi : T0 × Ti → Ai be the map defined by gi(t0p, ti) = g
p
i (ti) for all p ∈ P
and let g = (g1, · · · , gℓ).
We next claim that g is a strong purification of f , that is, it satisfies Items 1-4 in
Definition 5.2.5. It is clear that the Items 3 and 4 are the above Assertions (ii) and (iii)
respectively. We only need to prove Items 1 and 2 in the definition.
Towards this end, for any mixed strategy f˜i of player i, let f˜ = (f˜i, f−i), and












vf˜ipq(ti, ai)f˜i(t0p, ti; dai)µ
pq
i (dti), (5.6)











vg˜ipq(ti, ai)f˜i(t0p, ti; dai)µ
pq
i (dti). (5.7)









jpq for all j 6= i, all p ∈ P and q ∈ Q. As a result, v
f˜
ipq(ti, ai) =
vfipq(ti, ai) = v
g
ipq(ti, ai) = v
g˜
ipq(ti, ai). Hence, by Equations (5.6) and (5.7), we have
Ui(f˜) = Ui(g˜).



























then, Ui(g) = Ui(f) by Equation (5.3) and Assertion (i) above.
5.3 Main Results
For any private information game, if the payoff functions satisfy Assumption 5.2.3 and the
players’ private information is conditionally independent, given the public and payoff-
relevant common information (Assumption 5.2.1), it follows from Theorem 5.2.6 that
the saturation property for the private information space (Ti,Ti, µi), for every player i, is
sufficient to guarantee the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium. In the sequel, we
investigate the necessity result; for simplicity, we only consider the simple games where
both T0 and S0 contain only a single element, and for simplicity, we omit s0 in the payoff
functions and t0 in the strategies.
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5.3.1 Khan et al. (1999) Revisited
This private information game is denoted by Γ0, there are two players i = 1, 2, and for
player i, they have the same action space Ai = [−1, 1], the same private information
space (Ti,Ti, µi), the Lebesgue interval (I = [0, 1],L, η). Now the information structure
is simply (T1 × T2,T1 ⊗ T2, µ1 ⊗ µ2).
The payoff functions are defined as follows,
u1(a1, a2, t) = −|t− |a1||+ (t− a1)z(t, a2), (5.8)
u2(a1, a2, t) = −|t− |a2|| − (t− a2)z(t, a1), (5.9)




a, if 0 ≤ a ≤ t;
t, if t < a ≤ 1;
−z(t,−a), if a < 0;
and for any t ∈ (1/2, 1], z(t, ·) = z(1/2, ·), that is, for all indexes t in [1/2, 1], the
functions are identical. Note that the specification implies that for the 0th signal, we
obtain the zero function; z(0, a) ≡ 0 for all a ∈ [−1, 1]. Notice that ui ≥ −2, for all
i = 1, 2.
Let w : I ×M([−1, 1]) → R be such that for any Borel probability measure ν on
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We can then obtain vi : Ai × Ti ×M([−1, 1]) → R from ui i = 1, 2, such that
v1(a1, t, ν) =
∫
a2∈A2
u(a1, a2, t) dν(a2) = −|t− |a1||+ (t− a1)w(t, ν),
v2(a2, t, ν) =
∫
a1∈A1
u(a1, a2, t) dν(a1) = − |t− |a2|| − (t− a2)w(t, ν).
We now present the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game Γ0 in terms of the




2) be the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a game with
the induced distribution ν∗i = λ ◦ g
∗−1
i on the action set Ai, i = 1, 2. Then, for almost





2 ) ≥ v1(a1, t, ν
∗





1 ) ≥ v2(a2, t, ν
∗
1 ) for all a2 ∈ [−1, 1].
That is, one player’s expected payoff is influenced by the other player’s strategy only
through the induced distribution over the actions, and moreover, the influence of this
distribution is only through the function w, and this influence itself depends on the
signal.
Now we turn to the best response correspondence for this game Γ0. As mentioned
above, the function w plays a crucial role in the determination of the best actions. In
particular, if w(t, ν) is zero, there are two best actions t and −t in the event of the signal
t. If it is positive, the first player takes the action t, and the second player −t for the
signal t. The situation is reversed if w(t, ν) is negative. We now collect these results in
the next formal statement.
Lemma 5.3.1 (Proposition 2 in Khan et al. 1999). Let νi ∈ M([−1, 1]), i = 1, 2. Then
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for player 1,
argmaxa∈A1v1(·, t, ν2) =


{t,−t}, if w(t, ν2) = 0
{−t}, if w(t, ν2) > 0
{t}, if w(t, ν2) < 0.
(5.11)
For player 2, on the other hand,
argmaxa∈A2v2(·, t, ν1) =


{t,−t}, if w(t, ν1) = 0
{−t}, if w(t, ν1) < 0
{t}, if w(t, ν1) > 0.
(5.12)
The following result provides a characterization for the induced equilibrium distribu-
tions.
Lemma 5.3.2 (Claims 1 and 2 in Khan et al. 1999). Let ν∗1 and ν
∗
2 be the induced
equilibrium distributions, then w(t, ν∗i ) = 0 for any t ∈ I, and ν
∗
i ([0, a]) = ν
∗
i ([−a, 0]) =
a/2 for any a ∈ [0, 1/2].
By Lemma 5.3.2, if there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the induced dis-
tribution on [−1/2, 1/2] should be the uniform distribution. Moreover, it follows from
Lemma 5.3.1 that this uniform distribution is induced by a selection from the correspon-
dence {−t, t}. We thus obtain a contradiction, and complete the non-existence argument,
according to the following claim.1
Claim 5.3.3. There does not exist a L-measurable selection ψ from the correspondence
Ψ : [0, 1] ։ [−1, 1] with Ψ(t) = {−t, t} for all t ∈ [0, 1] such that the induced distribution
of ψ is the uniform distribution on the interval [−1, 1]. That is, for any a ∈ [0, 1],
ηψ−1([0, a]) = ηψ−1([−a, 0]) = a/2.
Next we comment on the possible extensions of this counter example.
1This is also Claim 6.1.2, which is systematically studied in Chapter 6.
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Remark 5.3.4. First, as mentioned in Section 6 of Khan et al. (1999), for any positive
integer greater than two, by the introduction of dummy players, we also have a coun-
terexample to the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in games with that many
number of players.
Remark 5.3.5. In the game Γ0, the action sets are represented by an interval of real
numbers, [−1, 1], nevertheless, one can extend this example to “games with any uncount-
able compact metric action sets, thereby showing that the properties of the interval are
not germane to the non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.” Towards this end,
for any uncountable, compact metric space A, there exists a continuous onto function
β : A → [−1, 1]. Moreover, by the Borel cross section theorem (see, e.g., Parthasarathy
(1967, pp. 21-24)), there is a Borel measurable mapping δ from [−1, 1] to A such that
β[δ(a)] = a for all a ∈ [−1, 1]. Let B = δ([−1, 1]), which is a subset in A homomorphic
to [−1, 1] via β and δ.2
For player i = 1, 2, let Ai be the set of actions for player i, which is a uncountable
compact metric space; and as above, let βi : Ai → [−1, 1] be the continuous onto map,
Bi ⊆ Ai be the subset which is homomorphic to [−1, 1]. Now, consider the following
game Γ¯. Let the Lebesgue interval be the private information signal space, and consider
the following two-player game with action sets Ai and the following payoff functions,
u¯1(a1, a2, t) = u1[β1(a1), β2(a2), t]
= −|t− |β1(a1)||+ [t− β1(a1)] · z[t, β2(a2)], ∀a1 ∈ B1,
u¯2(a1, a2, t) = u2[β1(a1), β2(a2), t]
= −|t− |β2(a2)|| − [t− β2(a2)] · z[t, β1(a1)], ∀a2 ∈ B2,
u¯i(a1, a2, t) = −3, ∀ai /∈ Bi, i = 1, 2,
where u1, u2 are the payoff functions in the game Γ0 in (5.8) and (5.9). In this game Γ¯,
2For details, see p.339 of Rath et al. (1995).
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for each player i, notice that ui ≥ −2, then any action not in Bi is strictly dominated by
any action in Bi. Consequently, rational player i will only need to consider the actions in
Bi, which is homomorphic to [−1, 1] via βi. Finally, since there exists no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in Γ0, neither in Γ¯.
Remark 5.3.6. For any atomless probability space (T,T , µ), as a result of Lemma 2.1
of Keisler and Sun (2009), there exists a measurable mapping h from (I,I, λ) to the
Lebesgue interval (I,L) such that the induced distribution of h is the Lebesgue measure
η. Consider the following game Γ˜, which is a variation of the above Γ0 with (T,T , µ)
being the private information space for both players, with the same action space [−1, 1]
and the following payoff functions,
u˜1(a1, a2, t) = u1(a1, a2, h(t)) = −|h(t)− |a1||+ [h(t) − a1] · z(h(t), a2),
u˜2(a1, a2, t) = u2(a1, a2, h(t)) = −|h(t)− |a2|| − [h(t) − a2] · z(h(t), a1).
In this game Γ˜, the utility function for each player with private signal t is the same for
this player in Γ0 with private signal h(t). As a result, with the map h at hands, we
can the game Γ˜ as a game where the each player’s private information space is modeled
by the Lebesgue interval as well. In the game Γ˜, the utility functions for players differ
from those in Γ0 only up to a rearrangement among the private signals. As a result,
the best response in the game Γ¯ can be obtained based on Lemma 5.3.1. Moreover, the
equilibrium distribution in the game Γ˜, if exists, also satisfies the results in Lemma 5.3.2.
Remark 5.3.7. We mentioned that this counter-example can easily be extended to the
general private information games as in Section 5.2, where there is a countable set of
states, T0 = {t0p : p ∈ P}, which is publicly announced which affect the strategies of all
players, and a countable set of payoff-relevant common states, S0 = {s0q : q ∈ Q}, that
affect the payoffs of all players.
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5.3.2 Necessity of Saturation
As mentioned in Khan et al. (1999), the above counterexample dims any chance of con-
structing a positive theory based on the usual formalizations of information spaces as
Lebesgue measure spaces, or more generally, on Polish spaces with an atomless mea-
sure. One natural question is whether we could establish such a positive theory based
on probability spaces other than Polish spaces. Theorem 5.2.6 answers this question
in affirmative by modeling the information spaces as saturated probability spaces. The
following theorem also indicates that the requirement of saturated probability spaces is
also necessary to establish such a positive theory. In particular, given a formalization
of information spaces with Assumptions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, to assure us a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium for games with payoff structures satisfying Assumption 5.2.3, then the
marginal probability space of the information structure conditional on any pair of public
and common states must be saturated.
Theorem 5.3.8. Given a finite set of ℓ players, for each player i, suppose that Ai is





information structure.3 If any private information game satisfying Assumptions 5.2.1 to
5.2.3 has a pure-strategy equilibrium, then (Ti,Ti, µi) is a saturated probability space for
every player i.
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose the private information structure for player
1, (T1,T1, µ1), is an atomless but not a saturated probability space. We in the sequel will
construct a counterexample in which there exists no pure strategy equilibrium based on
the given information structure.
Before constructing the counterexample, we first consider some measurable mappings
from (Ti,Ti, µi) to the Lebesgue interval ([0, 1],L, η) such that the induced distribution is
η. First, since (T2,T2, µ2) is an atomless probability space, as a result of Keisler and Sun
3Notice here, the conditionally independence, Assumption 5.2.1 is satisfied trivially.
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(2009, Lemma 2.1), there exists a measurable map h2 : T2 → [0, 1] such that the induced
distribution of h2 on [0, 1] is η. Second, since (T1,T1, µ1) is not a saturated probability
space, there exists a S ∈ T1 with µ1(S) > 0 (denoted µ1(S) by s) such that the restricted
measure space (S,T S1 , µ1) is countably generated.As a result of Maharam’s theorem (see
Maharam 1942), the measure algebra of (S,T S1 , µ1) is isomorphic to that of ([0, s],L
s, η),
where Ls is denoted by the σ-algebra of all Lebesgue subsets on [0, s]. Moreover, by
Lemma 2.3.2, this isomorphism can be realized by a measure preserving map hS from
(S,T S1 , µ1) to ([0, s],L
s, η). We now consider the measure space restricted to T1\S, the
complementary set for S in T1. Since it is an atomless measure space, by Lemma 2.1
of Keisler and Sun (2009) again, there exists a measurable map hT1\S : T1\S → [s, 1]
such that the induced distribution of hT1\S on [s, 1] is Lebesgue measure on [s, 1]. Let
h1 be the map from (T1,T1, µ1) to the Lebesgue interval defined by h1(t1) = hS(t1) for
every t1 ∈ S and h1(t1) = hT1\S(t1) for every t1 ∈ T1\S. It is clear that the induced
distribution of h1 is the Lebesgue measure.
We next construct a special game Γ˜ with the above information structure and the
action spaces Ai = [−1, 1] for all i. The payoff functions u˜i : A× Ti → R are defined as
follows:
u˜1(a, t1) = u1(a1, a2, h1(t1)) = −|h1(t1)− |a1||+ [h1(t1)− a1]z(h1(t1), a2) (5.13)
u˜2(a, t2) = u1(a1, a2, h2(t2)) = −|h2(t2)− |a2||+ [h2(t2)− a2]z(h2(t2), a1) (5.14)
u˜j(a, tj) ≡ 0, for other player j 6= 1, 2. (5.15)
It is clear that, in this game Γ˜, except player 1 and 2, the others are dummy players. For
player 1, the utility function at private information t1 (or t2) is the same as player 1 (or
2) in Γ0 at h1(t1) (or h2(t2)). In other words, the game Γ˜ (with player 1 and 2) differs
from Γ0 only up to some rearrangement for the private information. It is also clear that
utility functions u˜i, i ∈ I satisfy Assumption 5.2.3.
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We turn to show that there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game Γ˜.
Suppose (g∗i : i = 1, · · · , n) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Here g
∗
i : Ti → [−1, 1] is




Recall that the game Γ˜ (with player 1 and 2) differs from Γ0 only up to some re-
arrangement for the private information, it is implied that ν∗i for i = 1, 2 satisfy the
results in Lemma 5.3.2. In particular, for i = 1, 2, w[hi(ti), ν
∗
i ] = 0 for any ti ∈ Ti,
and ν∗i ([0, a]) = ν
∗
i ([−a, 0]) = a/2 for any a ∈ [0, 1/2]. In addition, by the definition of
u˜1 and Lemma 5.3.1, the best response set of player 1 at the private information t1 is
{h1(t1),−h1(t1)}. As a result g
∗
1(t1) is either h1(t1) or −h1(t1).
Let s′ = min{s, 1/2} and S′ = h−11 ([0, s
′]), it is clear that S′ ∈ T1 and is a subset








−1([−a, 0]) = ν∗1 ([−a, 0]) = a/2 for any a ∈ [0, s
′]. Notice that for any t1
in S′, h1(t1) = hS(t1). Let S1 = {t1 ∈ S
′ : g∗1(t1) = h1(t1) ≥ 0} = {t1 ∈ S
′ : hS(t1) ≥ 0},
then S1 ∈ T1 and S1 ⊆ S
′. Since hS induces one isomorphism between measure algebras
between (S,T S1 , µ1) and ([0, s],L
s, η), between (S′,T S
′
1 , µ1) and ([0, s
′],Ls
′
, η) as well,
there exists a S2 ∈ L with µ1(S1∆h
−1
S (S2)) = 0.
Now define ψ : [0, s′]→ [−s′, s′] by letting ψ(t) = t, if t ∈ S2 and −t if t ∈ [0, s
′]\S2.
It is clear that ψ is a L-measurable selection of the correspondence Ψ. For any a ∈ [0, s′],
we next show that ηψ−1([0, a]) = ηψ−1([−a, 0]) = a/2. We only need to show the first
part. In fact,
ηψ−1([0, a]) = η([0, a] ∩ S2) = µ1[h
−1
S ([0, a] ∩ S2)] [∵ hS induces an isomorphism]
= µ1[h
−1
S ([0, a]) ∩ h
−1
S (S2)] = µ1[h
−1
S ([0, a]) ∩ S1] [∵ µ1(S1∆h
−1
S (S2)) = 0]
= µ1[h
−1
1 ([0, a]) ∩ S1] = µ1g
∗
1
−1([0, a]) = a/2.
We can then construct a L-measurable selection of the correspondence Ψ from ψ such
that the induced distribution on [−1/2, 1/2] is uniform. This contradicts Claim 5.3.3,
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therefore, there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Γ˜ in which all
Ai = [−1, 1].
Finally, for the general case that Ai is any arbitrary uncountable compact metric
space, as illustrated in Remark 5.3.5, new counterexample can be constructed from the
above counterexample Γ˜ such that the pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist.
We thus complete the proof.
Remark 5.3.9. In our proof, for the private information space of player i, it is saturated
if the payoff functions for this player and one another player are allowed to change freely.
Similarly, for general private information games with more than one public state to
be publicly announced and more than one common payoff-relevant state, we have the
following result.
Corollary 5.3.10. Given a finite set of ℓ players, given two countable sets S0 and T0,
for each player i, suppose that Ai is a uncountable compact metric space. Let (Ω,F , µ)
be the private information structure satisfying Assumptions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. If any pri-
vate information game satisfying Assumption 5.2.3 has a pure-strategy equilibrium, then
(Ti,Ti, µ
pq
i ) is a saturated probability space for every player i, for any t0p ∈ T0 and
s0q ∈ S0.
Proof: Suppose that for some t0p ∈ T0 and s0q ∈ S0 (Ti,Ti, µ
pq
i ) is a not saturated
probability space for some player i. In the information structure (Ω,F , µ), for t0p, s0q,
recall that αpq = µ0({(t0p, s0q)}) > 0 and µ




Now consider a private information game Γ with the above information structure and
the payoff functions satisfy that for any q′ 6= q,
ui(s0q′ , a, ti) ≡ 0, for all a = (a1, · · · aℓ), ti, and i. (5.16)
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Given such a game Γ, let Γpq be the following private information game,
Γpq = {(Ti,Ti, µ
pq
i ), Ai, ui(s0q, ·)}
ℓ
i=1.
Based on Assumption 5.2.1, the private information structure for the game Γpq is the







By assumption, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in game Γ. Let
(g∗1 , · · · g
∗
ℓ ) be one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Γ, where g
∗
i : T0 × Ti → Ai is a
measurable mapping. For simplicity, denote g∗i (t0p, ·) by g
∗p





i ). It is clear that (g
∗p
1 , · · · g
∗p
ℓ ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for
game Γpq. Moreover, if (g¯∗p1 , · · · g¯
∗p
ℓ ) is another pure strategy Nash equilibrium for game
Γpq, then ((g¯∗p1 , g
∗−p




ℓ )) is also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of game
Γ. Consequently, if there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in game Γpq, neither
in game Γ.
Notice that player i’s private information space (Ti,Ti, µ
pq
i ) is not a saturated prob-
ability space, as in Theorem 5.3.8, we can construct a private information game Γpq
with suitable payoff functions such that there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Therefore as argued above, there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the private
information Γ constructed from (5.16) and Γpq.
5.4 Discussions
Remark 5.4.1. In Fu (2008), the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for
games with finite actions is obtained by applying the purification approach in Khan et al.
(2006), where for each player i, the marginal private information space (Ti,Ti, µi) is an
atomless probability space, and it not necessarily to be a saturated probability space.
Here the assumption of finite actions in games is a serious restriction since many games
require infinite action spaces.
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The paper Loeb and Sun (2007) is the first one to study games with general action
spaces and both private and public information structures, in which the relevant private
information probability spaces are Loeb probability spaces, which are special saturated
probability spaces. In such a setting, the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is
obtained by first establishing the regular properties for the distribution of close-valued
correspondences with respect to a vector measure on the Loeb probability space, then
applying the Fixed Point Theorem of Fan and Glicksberg.
In our paper, we adapt the purification approach to show the existence of pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium for the games.
Remark 5.4.2. In Fu et al. (2007), the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is shown
for games with finite actions, where the relevant private information probability spaces
are not necessarily saturated spaces. Moreover, each player’s private information is
also divided into two parts, one for payoff-relevant private information and another for
strategy-relevant private information. Using the techniques Khan et al. (2006) and this
paper, we can generalize the result in Theorem 5.2.6 to this more general setting.
Chapter 6
Lebesgue Extension and Correspondences
6.1 Introduction
In an influential paper, Aumann (1965) presented a theory of integration of set-valued
functions modeled on the Lebesgue interval and taking values in a finite-dimensional
Euclidean space Rn. In follow-up work, Hart and Kohlberg (1974) presented a theory
of distribution of correspondences taking finite values. These resulting theories revolve
around the properties of convexity, closedness, compactness and upper semicontinuity,
and have found extensive application in optimal control theory and in mathematical
economics, in particular; see the textbooks Mordukhovich (2006, Chapters 6-7), and
Hildenbrand (1974) for additional details and references.
In the last ten years, motivated by the study of “perfect competition”, and of “large
games”, there has been a need to consider correspondences with more general range
spaces, and here the Lebesgue interval has been a rather severe limitation. In a series of
decisive counterexamples, it has been shown that the theory does not generalize when
based on the Lebesgue interval; see Sun (1996, 1997), Loeb and Sun (2007) and the
references and discussion furnished in Khan and Sun (2002).
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These counterexamples draw essentially on the following claims1 in which correspon-
dence is used synonymously for a correspondence, I = [0, 1], L the σ-algebra of Lebesgue
measurable sets, η the Lebesgue measure defined on L, and (I,L, η), the Lebesgue unit
interval. All this three claims are related to a correspondence due to Debreu (1967) (see
Ψ in Claim 6.1.2).
Claim 6.1.1. There does not exist a L-measurable selection φ from the correspon-
dence Φ : I ։ {−1, 1} with Φ(i) = {−1, 1} for all i ∈ I such that for any t ∈
I,
∫ t
0 φ(i) dη(i) = 0.
Claim 6.1.2. There does not exist a L-measurable selection ψ from the correspondence
Ψ : I ։ [−1, 1] with Ψ(i) = {−i, i} for all i ∈ I such that the induced distribution of ψ
is the uniform distribution on the interval [−1, 1], i.e., for any s ∈ [−1, 1], η({ψ < s}) =
(s+ 1)/2.







and W1(i) ≡ −1, Wn(i) = (−1)
[2n−1i] for n ≥ 2,
[x] the integer part of x. f is Bochner integrable with integral e ≡ (1, {2−n−1}∞n=1); see
Diestel and Uhl (1977, Chapter II) for Bochner integration.
Claim 6.1.3. There does not exist a L-measurable selection π from the correspondence
Π : I ։ ℓ2 with Π(i) = {0, f(i)} for all i ∈ I such that the Bochner integral of π is e/2.
As a result of these claims, a robust theory of the integral and distribution of corre-
spondences has been constructed, but one that has been forced to jettison the Lebesgue
interval. In the first instance, such a theory has been based on an atomless Loeb prob-
ability space, as in Sun (1996, 1997). Moreover, Keisler and Sun (2009) obtain a more
general result, they show that such desired regular properties are valid on saturated
1For the validity of Claims 6.1.1 to 6.1.3, see Khan and Sun (2002) and their references.
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probability spaces and invalid on any non-saturated probability spaces. In other words,
the saturated probability spaces provide a sufficient and necessary measure theoretic
structure to obtain such desired properties on the distribution or integral of correspon-
dences.
In this chapter, we argue that in so far as the specific Claims 6.1.1 to 6.1.3 are
concerned, one need not go all the way to the complexity of saturated probability spaces,
and that the required selections can be found by a simple countably-generated extension
of the Lebesgue interval, see Section 6.2. To put the matter another way, we propose a
probability space with a countably-generated σ-algebra which suffices to negate the above
claims, ensure the required properties for these correspondences, and thereby suffices for
the substantive applications. Our results then point out the need for a compelling and a
natural example for which our proposed probability space does not work, and for which
a saturated probability space is essential. To be sure, given the Keisler and Sun (2009)
necessity results, such an example exists.
It is very important to understand the necessity result in Keisler and Sun (2009). In
terms of the distribution of correspondences, for example, in Loeb and Sun (2009, Theo-
rem 3.6, P2-P3), the necessity is formulated that if the distribution of any closed valued
correspondence is closed and convex, then the underlying probability space is necessarily
to be saturated. However, it is well-known that for the Debreu correspondence Ψ defined
on the Lebesgue unit interval with Ψ(i) = {i,−i} for any i ∈ I = [0, 1], the distribution
of Ψ can neither be closed nor convex, this is another version of Claim 6.1.2.
In this chapter, with various Lebesgue extensions constructed in Section 2.2 in place,
we can understand this necessity result via the Debreu correspondence Ψ as follows.
As far as this specific correspondence Ψ is concerned, one need not go all the way to
the complexity of saturated probability spaces, and that the required selections can
be found in a simple countably-generated extension, (I,I, λ), of the Lebesgue interval
(I,L, η), see Theorem 6.2.7. Now, as the space (I,I, λ) is not saturated, there must
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exist a set-valued function defined on it whose distribution is not closed and/or convex.
What is interesting, and somewhat of a surprise, is that this existential statement can be
underscored by a constructive one; and furthermore, the set-valued function exhibiting
“irregularities” on the extended space is a “simple” transformation of the originally given
one. And the nature of the transformation is such that the extended space (I,I, λ) can
be extended one more time to a countably-generated space (I,I1, λ1) to subdue the
irregularities of the transformed set-valued function in precisely the same way that the
original correspondence was subdued (see Section 6.3.1)! But the fact that (I,I1, λ1) is
also countably-generated, a second appeal to the Keisler-Sun necessity results leads to
a repetition of the process. And this repetition can be continued ad infinitum to obtain
{(I,In, λn)}n∈N, thereby giving insight into how rich a saturated probability space really
is. It cannot be attained in a countably infinite number of extensions.
As an application, using such a sequence of countably generated Lebesgue extensions,
we in this chapter also investigate some implications of the necessity results on saturated
probability spaces, namely, the necessity part in Keisler and Sun (2009, Theorem 4.6)
for the modeling of player space in the theory of large games, Theorem 5.3.8 for the
modeling of diffused information in private information games in Chapter 5.
Here is the organization of this chapter. In Section 6.2, we show that the countably
generated Lebesgue extension can be used to resolve the problems arisen from Claim
6.1.1 to 6.1.3, then general results are established like the closedness and convexity of
the distribution of the Debreu correspondence on the Lebesgue extension. Section 6.3
provides a viewpoint to understand the necessity of saturation with the assistance of a
sequence of countably generated Lebesgue extensions, then this approximate approach
is applied into large games and private information games. Finally, some remarks and
comments are presented in Section 6.4.
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6.2 Main Results
6.2.1 Claims 6.1.1 to 6.1.3 Reconsidered
In this section we will work with the countably generated Lebesgue extension (I,I, λ)
constructed in Section 2.2.1 where (K,K, κ) is another copy of the Lebesgue unit interval
(I,L, η). The importance of this construction reported lies not in itself, but in the fact
that it is entirely successful in resolving the three negative claims presented in Section 1,
which is to say that it allows the construction of I-measurable mappings satisfying the
required conditions. We turn to this.
Let S1 =
⋃
k∈[0,1/2) Ck and S2 =
⋃
k∈[1/2,1)Ck, where Ck is a subset of I in the
collection C in Lemma 2.2.1. Recall that C is a partition of I, then S2∩S2 = ∅, S1∪S2 = I.
These subsets will be used in all of the three demonstrations in the sequel.
Lemma 6.2.1. For i = 1, 2, Si ∈ I, but Si /∈ L. Moreover, λ(Si ∩ [0, t)) = t/2, for any
t ∈ [0, 1], and in particular, λ(Si) = 1/2.
Proof: Since S2 is the complement of S1 in I, we only need to proof the result for
S1.
By the construction of the subset C ⊆ I×K, ξ−1(S1) = {(i, k) : i ∈ Ck, k ∈ [0, 1/2)};
notice the latter is C ∩ (I× [0, 1/2)), then ξ−1(S1) ∈ T by definition of T . It follows that
S1 ∈ I because ξ is an isomorphism between (C,T , γ) and (I,I, λ).
For any t ∈ [0, 1], notice that (I,I, λ) is an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval
(I,L, η), [0, t) ∈ I. Consequently, S1 ∩ [0, t) ∈ I since S1 ∈ I. Moreover, for any t,
ξ−1(S1 ∩ [0, t)) = {(i, k) : i ∈ Ck; i ≤ t, k ∈ [0, 1/2)} = C ∩ ([0, t) × [0, 1/2)).
Then we have
λ(S1∩[0, t)) = γ[ξ
−1(S1∩[0, t))] = γ[C∩([0, t)×[0, 1/2))] = (η⊗κ)([0, t)×[0, 1/2)) = t/2,
82 Chapter 6. Lebesgue Extension and Correspondences
where the first and third equalities follow from the definition of λ and γ respectively.
Next we show that S1 /∈ L. Suppose not. Since λ(Si ∩ [0, t)) = t/2 for all t, it follows
that for any open interval (t1, t2) ⊆ [0, 1], λ[S1 ∩ (t1, t2)] = (t2 − t1)/2. This contradicts
Halmos (1950, Theorem A).
Given the Lebesgue extension (I,I, λ) and S1, S2 ∈ I as above, we are now ready to
demonstrate the existence of the required selections from the correspondences in Claim-
s 6.1.1 to 6.1.3.
Proposition 6.2.2. For the correspondence Φ : I ։ {−1, 1} with Φ(i) = {−1, 1},∀i ∈ I,
there exists an I-measurable selection φ such that for any t ∈ I,
∫ t
0 φ(i) dλ(i) = 0.
Proof: Define φ : I → {1,−1} by letting φ(i) = 1 if i ∈ S1, and φ(i) = −1 if i ∈ S2,
where S1 and S2 are the disjoint subsets in Lemma 6.2.1. Since S1 and S2 are both
I-measurable subsets in I, φ is an I-measurable function. Moreover, for any t ∈ [0, 1],
on applying Lemma 6.2.1 again,
∫ t
0







Therefore, φ is the required selection from the correspondence Φ.
Proposition 6.2.3. For the correspondence Ψ : I ։ [−1, 1] with Ψ(i) = {−i, i} for all
i ∈ I, there exists an I-measurable selection ψ, such that the induced distribution of ψ is
the uniform distribution on the interval [−1, 1], i.e., for any s ∈ [−1, 1], λ({ψ ≤ s}) =
(s+ 1)/2.




i, if i ∈ S1;
−i, if i ∈ S2.
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It is well-defined since S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, and S1 ∪ S2 = I. For any s ∈ [−1, 1],
{ψ ≤ s} =


S2 ∪ (S1 ∩ [0, s]), if s ≥ 0;
S2 ∩ [−s, 1]), if s < 0.
By Lemma 6.2.1, S1, S2 are I-measurable subsets in I. Note that all the subsets of the
form [0, s] for any s ≥ 0, and [−s, 1] for any s < 0, are L-measurable, and since (I,I, λ)
is an extension of (I,L, η), they are all I-measurable. Hence, ψ is an I-measurable
function.
Moreover, for any s ∈ [−1, 1], notice S1 and S2 are disjoint and applying Lemma 6.2.1,
λ{ψ ≤ s} =


λ[S2 ∪ (S1 ∩ [0, s])] = λ(S2) + λ(S1 ∩ [0, s]), if s ≥ 0






Therefore, the I-measurable function ψ is the required selection from the correspon-
dence Ψ.







and W1(i) ≡ −1, Wn(i) = (−1)
[2n−1i] for n ≥ 2.














It is clear that f is Bochner integrable with integral e ≡ (1, {2−n−1}∞n=1).
Proposition 6.2.4. For the correspondence Π : I ։ ℓ2 with Π(i) = {0, f(i)}, there
exists a I-measurable selection π, such that the Bochner integral of the selection is e/2.
Proof: Define an I-measurable selection π of Π by letting π(i) = f(i) if i ∈ S1, and
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That is, λ(S1) = 1/2 and for n ≥ 2, λ[S1 ∩ En] = 1/4. Indeed, the former is a result of
Lemma 6.2.1. For n ≥ 2, notice that En is a finite union of disjoint sub-intervals with
λ(En) = 1/2, then we have λ[S1 ∩ En] = λ(En)/2 = 1/4 because that λ[S1 ∩ [0, t)] =
t/2 for any t ∈ [0, 1] (Lemma 6.2.1). Therefore π is the required selection from the
correspondence Π.
6.2.2 General Properties on the Debreu Correspondence
The correspondence considered in Claim 2, originally due to Debreu (see Hart and Kohlberg
1974), is used in Sun (1996) to show that the distribution of a set-valued function on an
abstract probability space is, in general, neither closed nor convex. Sun used these facts
to discredit the Lebesgue interval as a basis for the investigation of correspondences,
arguing that the “Lebesgue interval fails to provide a suitable framework for a lrge class
of problems,” and proposing instead the Loeb measure Loeb (1975) based on hyperfinite
models. This proposal has been profoundly influential for applications in mathematical
economics, as surveyed in Khan and Sun (1997, 2002). However, given the existence of
the required selections when these correspondences are based on the Lebesgue extension,
one is led to ask whether the general results are themselves true for these specific corre-
spondences on the proposed probability space. This is to ask whether the irregularities
that these correspondences manifest in the context of the Lebesgue interval can be en-
tirely subdued in the context of its simple extension that we propose here. We give an
affirmative answer to this question, but one that turns out perhaps to be slightly more
involved than one would anticipate.
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First, we present a result which will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 6.2.5. Suppose a measure µ on [0, 1] satisfies the following: (i) µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to η, and (ii) µ([0, t)) ≤ t for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Then there exists an I-
measurable subset Sµ in the countably-generated extension (I,I, λ), a set not necessarily
L-measurable, such that for each t, we have
µ([0, t)) = λ[Sµ ∩ [0, t)].
Proof: According to (i) and (ii), there exists a L-measurable function fµ which is the
Radon-Nikodym derivative of µ with respect to η, and without loss of generality, we can
assume 0 ≤ fµ ≤ 1. It is clear that fµ is η-integrable and µ([0, t)) =
∫ t
0 fµdη for all
t ∈ [0, 1].
Next, we construct Sµ. Let Γ(fµ) ⊆ I×K be the hypograph of the function fµ : I →
[0, 1] (see Figure 2 below), i.e.,
Γ(fµ) = {(i, k) ∈ I ×K : i ∈ I, k ≤ fµ(i)}.
It is clear that Γ(fµ) is (L ⊗K)-measurable because fµ is Lebesgue measurable. Now
define Sµ = ξ[Γ(fµ) ∩ C]; see Section 2.2.1for the construction of C and ξ. By the
construction of (C,T , γ), Γ(fµ) ∩ C ∈ T . Moreover, the Lebesgue extension (I,I, λ)
is isomorphic to (C,T , γ) via the 1-1 mapping ξ. Consequently, Sµ is an I-measurable
subset in I.
Finally, we show that Sµ ∈ I is the required subset. Indeed, for any t ∈ [0, 1], we






Figure 2: Hypograph of fµ
have
λ[Sµ ∩ [0, t)] = γ[ξ
−1(Sµ ∩ [0, t))] (Definition of λ)
= γ[C ∩ Γ(fµ) ∩ ([0, t) × [0, 1])]




fµdη = µ([0, t)).
Remark 6.2.6. Note that that Lemma 6.2.1 is a special case of Lemma 6.2.5 where µ
is the uniform distribution on [−1, 1]. We present a complete proof of Lemma 6.2.1 to
orient the reader by presenting the argument for a special case.
Next, we turn to the correspondence Ψ : I ։ [−1, 1] with Ψ(i) = {−i, i} for each
i ∈ I. Define
DΨ(λ) = {λ ◦ ψ
−1 : ψ is an I-measurable selection of Ψ},
where λ ◦ ψ−1 is the distribution induced by ψ. For any Borel set B in [−1, 1], let
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Ψ−1(B) = {i ∈ I : Ψ(i) ∩ B 6= ∅}. Note that the correspondence Ψ is closed-valued
and Ψ−1(B) = {|t| : t ∈ B}, which is also a Borel set in [0, 1]. We can now present the
following result.
Theorem 6.2.7. DΨ(λ) is closed and convex.
Proof: For the closedness part, Proposition 3.5 of Keisler and Sun (2009) provides a
useful characterization for Borel probability measures in the closure of DΨ(λ). In partic-
ular, the Borel probability measure µ on [−1, 1] belongs to the closure of DΨ(λ), if and
only if,
µ(O) ≤ λ[Ψ−1(O)] for any open set O ⊆ [−1, 1]. (6.2)
As a result, to prove the closedness of DΨ(λ), we only need to show that any Borel
probability measure satisfying (6.2) can be induced by some I-measurable selection of
Ψ.
Let µ be a Borel probability measure on [−1, 1] satisfying (2). We next show that,
as a Borel measure on [0, 1], µ satisfies the conditions in Lemma 6.2.5. It is clear that µ
is absolutely continuous with respect to η. Moreover, for any fixed t ∈ [0, 1], we claim
that, µ([0, t)) ≤ t. Towards this end, let B1 = (−t, t) and B2 = [−1,−t) ∪ (t, 1]. It is
clear that Ψ−1(B1) = [0, t) with λ[Ψ
−1(B1)] = t; in addition, it follows from (2) that
µ(B1) ≤ t. Similarly, we also have Ψ
−1(B2) = (t, 1], λ[Ψ
−1(B2)] = 1−t and µ(B2) ≤ 1−t.
Notice that µ(B1 ∪ B2) = µ(B1) + µ(B2) = 1, then µ(B1) = t. As a result, we have
µ([0, t)) ≤ µ(B1) = t.
Due to Lemma 6.2.5, there exists an subset Sµ ∈ I in the countably-generated
extension (I,I, λ), such that for each t ∈ [0, 1], µ([0, t)) = λ[Sµ ∩ [0, t)]. Then define




i, if i ∈ Sµ;
−i, if i /∈ Sµ.
It is clear that ψ is an I-measurable selection of Ψ.
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We next show that the induced distribution of ψ is µ. It is clear that for any
0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ 1, λ[ψ
−1(t1, t2)] = λ[Sµ∩(t1, t2)] = µ[(t1, t2)]; moreover, λ[ψ
−1(−t2,−t1)] =
λ[(I \Sµ)∩ (t1, t2)] = t2− t1−µ[(t1, t2)] = µ[(−t2,−t1)], where the last equation follows
from µ[(−t, t)] = t for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that the Borel σ-algebra on [−1, 1] is generated
by these open intervals, thus, the induced distribution of the I-measurable function ψ is
µ. Therefore we proved that DΨ(λ) is closed.
Finally, the convexity of DΨ(λ) follows straightforward from the closedness of DΨ(λ)
and (2). In fact, let µ1, µ2 be two Borel probability measures in DΨ(λ), then they both
satisfy (2). For any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, it is clear that the Borel probability measure αµ1 + (1−
α)µ2, denoted by µ
′, also satisfies (2). Due to Keisler and Sun (2009, Proposition 3.5),
µ′ belongs to the closure of DΨ(λ). Since DΨ(λ) is closed, µ
′ = αµ1 + (1− α)µ2 belongs
to DΨ(λ) as well.
Remark 6.2.8. Note that that Proposition 6.2.3 is a special case of Theorem 6.2.7, and
that more generally, it underscores the fact that all that is required to eliminate the
irregularities of Sun (1996, Example 1) is that one work with the extended Lebesgue
interval being proposed here.
6.3 Lebesgue Extensions and Correspondences
It is important to understand the general technique in Keisler and Sun (2009) as quoted
in Introduction. If the space is not saturated, as the space (I,I, λ) constructed here,
there must exist a set-valued function defined on it whose distribution is not closed
and/or convex, and whose integral is not convex. What is interesting, and somewhat
of a surprise, is that this existential statement can be underscored by a constructive
one; and furthermore, the set-valued function exhibiting “irregularities” on the extended
space is a “simple” transformation of the originally given one. And the nature of the
transformation is such that the extended space (I,I, λ) can be extended one more time to
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a countably-generated space (I,I1, λ1) to subdue the irregularities of the transformed set-
valued function in precisely the same way that the original correspondence was subdued!
But the fact that (I,I1, λ1) is also countably-generated, a second appeal to the Keisler-
Sun results leads to a repetition of the process. And this repetition can be continued
ad infinitum to obtain {(I,In, λn)}n∈N, thereby giving insight into how rich a saturated
probability space really is. It cannot be attained in a countably infinite number of
extensions.
6.3.1 Distribution on (I, I1, λ1)
In this subsection, we show that on (I,I, λ), the countably-generated extension of the
Lebesgue interval (I,L, η), there exists a closed-valued correspondence Ψ1 (to be defined
below) whose distribution with respect to λ, DΨ1(λ), is neither closed nor convex. More-
over, as in Section 2.2.2, we can then find a countably-generated extension of (I,I, λ),
(I,I1, λ1), such that on this new extension, DΨ1(λ1) does not have exhibit any such
irregularities, which is to say that the distribution of Ψ1 with respect to λ1 is closed and
convex.
The basic observation is simply this: Since both the Lebesgue unit interval (I,L, η)
and its extension (I,I, λ) are countably-generated, by Maharam’s theorem, there is an
isomorphism ρ from (Lˆ, ηˆ) to (Iˆ, λˆ). By Lemma 2.3.2, there exists a measure-preserving
mapping h : (I,I, λ) → (I,L, η) such that ρ can be realized by h. Simply define Ψ1 =
Ψ ◦ h, i.e., Ψ1(i) = {h(i),−h(i)} for all i ∈ I.
DΨ1(λ) is neither Closed nor Convex
We show that DΨ1(λ) = DΨ(η), and, as a result, DΨ1(λ1) is neither closed nor convex.
First, for any L-measurable selection ψ of Ψ, it is clear that ψ ◦ h is an I-measurable
selection of Ψ1 and λ ◦ (ψ ◦ h)
−1 = λ[h−1 ◦ ψ−1] = η ◦ ψ−1. Hence DΨ(η) ⊆ DΨ1(λ).
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We next prove the converse part, DΨ1(λ) ⊆ DΨ(η). Assume µ is a Borel probability
measure in DΨ1(λ) and it is induced by an I-measurable selection ψ1 of Ψ1, i.e., λ◦ψ
−1
1 =
µ. Let S = {i ∈ I : ψ1(i) = h(i) ≥ 0}, then S ∈ I. Since the measure algebra
isomorphism ρ is realized by the measure preserving map h, then there exist a S′ ∈ L
such that h−1(S′) ∈ I with λ(h−1(S′)∆S) = 0. Now define ψ : I → [−1, 1] by letting
ψ(i) = i, if i ∈ S′ and −i if i /∈ S′. It is clear that ψ is a L-measurable selection of Ψ.
Moreover, the induced distribution by ψ is µ. Here we only need to show that for any
Borel set B ⊆ [0, 1], ηψ−1(B) = µ(B). In fact,
µ(B) = λψ−11 (B) = λ[h
−1(B) ∩ S]
= λ[h−1(B) ∩ h−1(S′)] = λ[h−1(B ∩ S′)]
= η(B ∩ S′) = ηψ−1(B).
DΨ1(λ1) is Closed and Convex
In this section instead of (I,I, λ), we will work on it’s countably generated extension,
(I,I1, λ1) obtained in Section 2.2.2. Next we showed that DΨ1(λ1) is closed and convex.
The argument is analogous to that used in the proof of Theorem 6.2.7. Here we only
prove the closedness part. According to Proposition 3.5 of Keisler and Sun (2009), a
Borel probability measure µ on [−1, 1] is in the closure of DΨ1(λ1), if and only if,
µ(O) ≤ λ1[Ψ
−1
1 (O)], for all Borel open set O ⊆ [−1, 1]. (6.3)
As a result, for any Borel probability measure µ satisfying (3), we only need to show
that there exists an I1-measurable selection ψ1 of Ψ1 with λ1 ◦ ψ
−1
1 = µ.
Next, we claim that as a Borel probability measure on [0, 1], µ satisfies the two
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conditions in Lemma 6.2.5. In fact, for any t ∈ [0, 1],
µ([0, t)) ≤ λ1[Ψ
−1
1 ([0, t))] = λ1[h
−1[Ψ−1([0, t))]] ((3), Ψ1 = Ψ ◦ h)
= λ[h−1[Ψ−1([0, t))]] (h−1[Ψ−1([0, t))] ∈ I)
= η[Ψ−1([0, t))] (λh−1 = η)
≤ η([0, t)) = t.
Moreover, it is clear that µ is absolutely continuous w.r.t. η. As in the proof of Lem-
ma 6.2.5, let fµ : (I,L, η)→ [0, 1] be the Radon-Nikodym derivative of µ with respect to
the Lebesgue measure η. Now define gµ = fµ ◦ h, which is an I-measurable function on
(I,I, λ). Let Γ(gµ) be the hypograph of gµ in the product probability space of (I,I, λ)
and the Lebesgue unit interval. Let S′µ = ξ
′[Γ(gµ) ∩ C
′], where ξ′ is the projection of





h(i), if i ∈ S′µ;
−h(i), if i /∈ S′µ.
It is clear that ψ1 is a selection of the correspondence of Ψ1 : (I,I1, λ1)։ [−1, 1].
Finally, we verify that the induced distribution of ψ1 is µ. As in the proof of Theorem
6.2.7, it suffices to prove that λ1[ψ
−1
1 ([0, t))] = µ([0, t)) for any t ∈ [0, 1]. In fact,
λ1[ψ
−1











fµ dη = µ([0, t)), (4)
where the third equation follows from substitution of variables, and the fourth follows
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· · ·· · ·
(I,L, η)
(I,I, λ)(I,I1, λ1)(I,In, λn)
[−1, 1]
Figure 3: The Necessity of Saturation: Distribution
The procedure can be illustrated in Figure 3. We conclude this subsection with some
comments on Figure 3. Denote (I,I, λ) by (I,I0, λ0), and (I,L, η) by (I,I−1, λ−1). For
n ≥ 0, the probability space (I,In, λn) is a countably-generated extension of (I,In−1, λn−1)
which can be constructed inductively as discussed in Section 2.2.2 above. The key idea
is to establish an analogue of Lemma 2.2.4, which is to construct a continuum of subsets
in (I,In−1, λn−1) such that each subset has λn−1 inner measure 0, outer measure 1, and
all subsets consist of a partition of [0, 1].
Since (I,In, λn) is a countably-generated probability space, for each n ∈ N, there
exists a measure-preserving mapping hn : (I,In, λn) → (I,L, η) which induces an iso-
morphism between the measure algebras for the two probability spaces. Moreover, define
the set-valued function Ψn : (I,In+1, λn+1) ։ [−1, 1] inductively as Ψn = Ψ ◦ hn−1. As
in the argument in Section 6.3.1, for n ≥ 0, DΨn(λn−1) = DΨ(η), hence DΨn(λn−1)
is neither closed nor convex. In contrast, for each n ≥ 1, DΨn(λn) is both closed and
convex. This can be achieved by using the same trick as in Section 6.3.1. For example,
to prove the closedness, for any Borel probability measure µ in DΨn(λn), the key point
is to find Sµ ∈ In such that µ([0, t)) = λn[Sµ ∩ h
−1
n−1[0, t)],∀t ∈ [0, 1]. Here we can
construct Sµ via the hypograph of the function fµ ◦hn−1 : (I,In−1, λn−1)→ [0, 1], where
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fµ : (I,L, η)→ [0, 1] is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of µ, viewed as a Borel probability
measure on [0, 1], with regard to η.
Such irregularities on the distribution of closed-valued correspondences can be reme-
died by working with saturated probability spaces. It is shown in Keisler and Sun (2009,
Theorem 3.6) that on a saturated probability space, the distribution for any closed-valued
correspondence is both closed and convex. Moreover, Theorem 3.7 therein assures us that
the saturation property is also necessary for the validity of such regular properties of any
closed-valued correspondence on a probability space. From this viewpoint, the contri-
bution of this chapter can also be seen as an emphasis on an approximate approach to
demonstrate the necessity of the saturated probability space in the context of keeping
the regular properties of the distributions for closed-valued correspondences.
6.3.2 Applications
Large Games on Lebesgue Extensions
In this section we further develop our underlying themes in the context of games. One
main concern here is how to model the set of players. If the set of players is the Lebesgue
interval, counterexamples in Khan et al. (1997), Rath et al. (1995) show that the Nash
equilibrium for certain games with a uncountably infinite set of actions does not exist.
Nevertheless, if the set of players is an atomless Loeb probability space, or a general
saturated probability space, an elegant property can be achieved that every game with
a large number of players, without any cardinality restrictions on the set of actions, has
a Nash equilibrium; see Khan and Sun (1996) and Keisler and Sun (2009) respectively.
Moreover, it is also shown in Keisler and Sun (2009) that saturated probability spaces are
also necessary for such an elegant property. The objective of this section is to provide an
understanding, as in Section 6.3.1, of the necessity of the saturation property by focusing
on certain games as in Khan et al. (1997), Rath et al. (1995).
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We shall first give a formal definition of a game based on a probability space of players
(Ω,F , P ). Let A be a compact metric space, and let UA be the space of real-valued
continuous functions on A ×M(A) endowed with the sup-norm topology, where M(A)
is the space of Borel probability measures on A associated with the weak convergence
topology. By a game G with player space Ω and action space A we will mean a random
element of UA on (Ω,F , P ). Thus, a game simply associates each player ω ∈ Ω with a
payoff function G(ω)(a, ν) that depends on the player’s own action a and the distribution
of actions by all the players, µ. To improve readability, we also use Gω to denote G(ω).
Definition 6.3.1. A Nash equilibrium of a game G is a random element g : Ω → A
such that for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω,
Gω[g(ω), P ◦ g
−1] ≥ Gω[a, P ◦ g
−1] for all a ∈ A.
Example: Consider a game G in which the set of players (Ω,F , P ) is the Lebesgue unit
interval (I = [0, 1],L, η), A is the interval [−1, 1], and the payoff function of any player
i ∈ I is given by
Gi(a, µ) = q[a, βd(µ
∗, µ)]− |i− |a|| where 0 < β < 1, a ∈ [−1, 1], µ ∈ M([−1, 1]),
µ∗ the uniform distribution on [−1, 1], d(µ∗, ν) the Prohorov distance between µ∗ and µ
based on the natural metric on [−1, 1], and q : [−1, 1] × [0, 1] → R+ defined as follows.
For any a ∈ [−1, 1], q(a, 0) ≡ 0; for any ℓ ∈ (0, 1], q(·, ℓ) is the periodic function, with




a/2, for 0 ≤ a ≤ ℓ/2;
(ℓ− a)/2, for ℓ/2 ≤ a ≤ ℓ;
−q(a− ℓ, ℓ), for ℓ ≤ a ≤ 2ℓ;
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with q(a, ℓ) = −q(−a, ℓ) for a < 0, and extended in both directions.
For such a game, as proved in Khan et al. (1997), there does not exist a Nash equi-
librium. Suppose g is a Nash equilibrium associated with the distribution µ on [−1, 1].
On the one hand, µ can not be the uniform distribution µ∗. Indeed, if so, for any player
i ∈ I, the set of her best response is {i,−i}, this is nothing but the set-valued function
Ψ above. It is stated in Claim 6.1.2 that there exists no L-measurable selection of Ψ
which induces the uniform distribution µ∗ on [−1, 1]. On the other hand, if µ 6= µ∗, the
choice of the function q can guarantee that the distribution induced by the best-response
correspondence is impossible to be the given µ and therefore precludes the existence of a
Nash equilibrium.
However, if we do not use the Lebesgue extension to model the set of players, and use
instead (I,I, λ), the countably-generated Lebesgue extension constructed in Section ??,
then there does exist a Nash equilibrium for the game G. Actually, the I-measurable
selection of Ψ, which induces the uniform distribution µ∗ on [−1, 1], is a Nash equilibrium
of G based on the new space of players (I,I, λ). Indeed, under such an I-measurable
selection of Ψ, for any player i ∈ I, her action is either i or −i in Ψ(i), which is the best
response against the uniform distribution of actions, µ∗, among all the players.
Notice that (I,I, λ) is a countably-generated probability space, take h : (I,I, λ) →
(I,L, η) to be the measure preserving map where the isomorphism between the measure
algebras, ρ from (Lˆ, ηˆ) to (Iˆ, λˆ), can be realized by h. Now consider the following game
G1 on (I,I, λ) with the same action set A = [−1, 1], for any player i, the payoff function
is,
G1i (a, µ) := Gh(i)(a, µ) = q[a, βd(µ
∗, µ)]− |h(i)− |a|| ,
where 0 < β < 1, a ∈ [−1, 1], µ ∈ M([−1, 1]).
Note that, in the new game G1, player i receives the identical payoff of player h(i) in
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the old game G, for all i ∈ I. Put differently, G1 can be played in two steps, first, there
is roughly a fixed permutation among players where the new order of player i is h(i),
then the old game G is played in which player i plays the same role as player h(i). For
simplicity, we next denote G1 by G ◦ h.
Theorem 6.3.2. If the player space is (I,I, λ), there exists no pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in G1.
Proof: Suppose g1 : (I,I, λ)→ [−1, 1] is a Nash equilibrium of G1. Let µ be the induced
distribution of g1, i.e., λ ◦ (g1)−1 = µ.
We first show that µ can not be the uniform distribution µ∗ on [−1, 1]. In fact, if
µ = µ∗, then for any player i, her best response is either h(i) or −h(i). Recall that
Ψ1(i) = (Ψ ◦h)(i) = {h(i),−h(i)}, that is to say, g
1 is I-measurable selection of Ψ1, and
g1 induces the uniform distribution µ∗ on [−1, 1]. However, this contradicts the result
DΨ1(λ) = DΨ(η) in Section 6.3.1 and µ
∗ is not in DΨ(η) (see Claim 6.1.2).
Let ℓ = βd(µ∗, µ). Note that µ 6= µ∗, ℓ is positive. It is straightforward (as in




{h(i)}, for h(i) ∈ ∪k∈N(2kℓ, (2k + 1)ℓ);
{−h(i)}, for h(i) ∈ ∪k∈N((2k + 1)ℓ, (2k + 2)ℓ);
{h(i),−h(i)}, for h(i) = kℓ, for some k ∈ N.
By definition of Nash equilibrium, without loss of generality, we assume that g1(i) ∈




i, for i ∈ ∪k∈N[2kℓ, (2k + 1)ℓ);
−i, for i ∈ ∪k∈N[(2k + 1)ℓ, (2k + 2)ℓ).
It is clear that g1(i) = g ◦ h(i) for i 6= kℓ with k ∈ N; in addition, µ = λ ◦ (g1)−1 =
λ(h−1 ◦ g−1) = η ◦ g−1, where the last equation holds since that h is measure preserving.
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Finally, we show that g is a Nash equilibrium of the game G based on the Lebesgue
unit interval (I,L, η), which contradicts the nonexistence result of Khan et al. (1997),
and we thus complete the proof. Towards this end, first, notice that g1 and g induce the
same distribution µ on [−1, 1]. For any player t ∈ h(I) with t 6= kℓ for any k ∈ N, fix a
player i such that t = h(i). We next show that for such a player t, in game G, g(t) is the
best response for her against µ. In fact, by the definition of Bi(µ) above, in game G
1,
for such a fixed player i, g1(i) = g[h(i)] = g(t) is the unique best response for her. As a
result, in game G, for such a player t, g(t) is the best response for her against µ. Finally,
we show that, in game G, the set of such players whose best responses are derived by
g is a η-full set (see Definition 6.3.1). Indeed, since the measure-algebra isomorphism ρ
is realized by h, without loss of generality, h(I) ∈ L with full η-measure. As a result,
{t ∈ h(I) : t 6= kℓ for some k ∈ N} is also a η-full set. We thus complete the proof.
Though G1 has no Nash equilibrium based on the countably-generated Lebesgue
extension (I,I, λ), we can construct a countably-generated extension of the extension to
assure that the game G1 has a Nash equilibrium based on the new extension. However, a
new game can be constructed from G1 such that it does not have Nash equilibria based
on the new extension; and so on ad infinitum. In such a way as in Section 6.3.1, we
can explain the necessity of saturation in the context of specific game with a continuum









· · ·· · ·
(I,L, η)
(I,I, λ)(I,I1, λ1)(I,In, λn)
U[−1,1]
Figure 4: The Necessity of Saturation: Large Games.
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Our comments on Figure 4 are in line with those on Figure 3. The spaces (I,In, λn)
and the mappings hn are the same as before. Denote (I,I, λ) by (I,I0, λ0), and (I,L, η)
by (I,I−1, λ−1). For n ≥ 1, the game G
n : (I,In+1, λn+1) → U[−1,1] is defined induc-
tively as Gn = G ◦ hn−1. For n ≥ 0, the game G
n has no Nash equilibrium based on
(I,In−1, λn−1). However, it has a Nash equilibrium based on (I,In, λn). To summarize,
we have the following result, the proof is similar to Theorem 6.3.2.
Theorem 6.3.3. If the player space is (I,I\, λn), there does not exist a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in Gn. However, if the player space is (I,In+1, λn+1) there does exist
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Gn.
Private Information Games on Lebesgue Extensions
It is claimed in Theorem 5.3.8 that given the information structure satisfying the in-
dependence and the diffusedness assumptions, the saturation property for each player’s
private information structure is also a necessary condition to guarantee the existence of
pure strategy equilibria for all game with the given information structure and with the
utility functions satisfying Assumption 5.2.3. In this Section, we provide an approxi-
mate approach to understand this necessary condition. This approach is systematically
studied in Chapter 5.
The key idea is as follows. Instead of considering all private information games with
the Assumptions 5.2.2 to 5.2.3, we focus the specific game Γ0 in Section 5.3.1. We
argue that in so far as this specific game is concerned, one need not go all the way
to the complexity of private information structure, the saturated probability spaces as
stated in Theorem 5.3.8, and that the required pure strategy equilibrium can be found
by working on a simple countably-generated extension of the Lebesgue interval, which
is not a saturated probability space. To put the matter another way, we propose a
probability space with a countably-generated σ-algebra which suffices to negate the non-
existence result. Our results then point out the need for a compelling and a natural
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private information game for which our proposed probability space does not work, i.e.,
the pure strategy equilibrium does not exist, and for which a saturated probability space
is essential. To be sure, given the above necessity result Theorem 5.3.8 such a counter
example exists.
As in last section, we will work in this section with a specific countably generated ex-
tension of the Lebesgue unit interval, see Section 2.2.2. There, starting from the Lebesgue
unit interval, a sequence of countably generated Lebesgue extensions, {(I,In, λn)}n≥0,
is constructed such that (I,In, λn) is a countably generated extension of (I,In−1, λn−1)
for each n.
In Section 5.3.1, we know that in the following two-player private information game
Γ0 = {(Ti,Ti, µi) = (I,L, η), Ai = [−1, 1], ui : i = 1, 2},
there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The key idea is that with the pri-
vate information structure being the Lebesgue unit interval, the corresponding Lebesgue
σ-algebra L is not rich enough to accommodate a measurable selection from the corre-
spondence Ψ with Ψ(t) = {t,−t} for any t ∈ [0, 1] such that the induced distribution
over the action space [−1, 1] is uniform, see Claim 6.1.2.
Next, we consider the following game,
Γ˜0 = {(Ti,Ti, µi) = (I,I, λ), Ai = [−1, 1], ui : i = 1, 2}.
Here Γ˜0 is the same game as Γ0 except that each player’s private information space is
replaced by the countably-generated Lebesgue extension constructed in Section 2.2.1.
According to the nature of the payoff functions ui, i = 1, 2 defined in (5.8) and (5.9), one
player’s expected payoff is influenced by the other’s strategy only through the induced
distribution over the action space. We present the following.
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Claim 6.3.4. There exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Γ˜0.
One indication of Claim 6.3.4 is that the non-existence result in game Γ0 can be
resolved if each player is allowed to upgrade his own private information structure from
the Lebesgue unit interval to a more rich one, an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval.
In addition, this extension of the private information structure might not too rich: it is
not a saturated probability space as required in Theorem 5.2.6, but a countably generated
extension of the Lebesgue unit interval thus itself a countably generated probability
space. However, as stated in Theorem 5.3.8, since this private information structure in
the game Γ˜0 is not a saturated probability space, then there exists a private information
game in which there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, based on the
main idea of the proof of Theorem 5.3.8, we provide the construction of such a private
information game Γ1 from the game Γ˜0.
Notice that (I,I, λ) is a countably-generated probability space, take h0 : (I,I, λ)→
(I,L, η) to be the measure preserving map where one isomorphism between the measure
algebras, ρ from (Lˆ, ηˆ) to (Iˆ, λˆ), can be realized by h0.
Γ1 = {(Ti,Ti, µi) = (I,I, λ), Ai = [−1, 1], u
1
i : i = 1, 2.}
The payoff functions are defined as follows,
u11(a1, a2, t1) = u1[a1, a2, h0(t1)]
u12(a1, a2, t2) = u2[a1, a2, h0(t2)]
where u1, u2 are the payoff functions in the games Γ0 or Γ˜0 as in (5.8) and (5.9). It is
clear that the game Γ1 is the same as Γ˜0 except that the payoff functions are replaced
by a composition of those in Γ˜0 and the mapping h0.
For simplicity, we write Γ1 = Γ˜0 ◦ h0. The following non-existence claim is a direct
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resul of the proof of Theorem 5.3.8.
Claim 6.3.5. There exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Γ1.
Though Γ1 has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which the private information
structure for each player is the countably-generated Lebesgue extension (I,I, λ), this
non-existence result can be resolved as in Claim 6.3.4. In particular, we can upgrade
each player’s private information structure again from (I,I, λ) to a countably generated
extension of (I,I, λ). The construction of such an extension of (I,I, λ), denoted by
(I,I1, λ1), is provided in Appendix. As before, denote this new game by Γ˜1, which is
same as Γ1 except the new private information structure. There exists a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in Γ˜1 (see Appendix). However, since the probability space (I,I1, λ1) is
still a countably generated probability space, a new game Γ2 can be constructed from Γ˜1
such that the new game Γ2 does not have Nash equilibria based on the new extension; etc.
We can continue inductively this procedure to infinitum, and we present this approximate









· · ·· · ·
· · ·· · ·
(I,L, η)
(I,I, λ)(I,I1, λ1)(I,In, λn)
R[−1,1]×[−1,1]
Figure 5 The Necessity of Saturation: Private Information Games
We conclude this section with some comments on this figure. Denote (I,I, λ) by
(I,I0, λ0). For n ≥ 1, the probability space (I,In, λn) is a countably-generated extension
of (I,In−1, λn−1) which can be constructed inductively as the construction of (I,I, λ) (see
Appendix). For n ≥ 0, since both (I,In, λn) is a countably-generated probability space,
according to Lemma 2.3.2, there exists a measure-preserving mapping hn : (I,In, λn) −→
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(I,L, η) which induces an isomorphism between the measure algebras for both probability
spaces.
Now we turn to the construction of uni , i = 1, 2, the payoff functions. For any i = 1, 2,
all n ≥ 0, uni is defined from (I,In−1, λn−1) to R
[−1,1]×[−1,1] where for each t ∈ I, uni (ti)
is a real-valued function on [−1, 1]× [−1, 1]×I defined as follows, for any a1, a2 ∈ [−1, 1],
uni (a1, a2, t) = ui[a1, a2, hn−1(t)],
where u1, u2 are in (5.8) and (5.9).
We consider the following private information games Γ˜n,Γn. For each n ≥ 0,
Γ˜n = {(Ti,Ti, µi) = (I,In, λn), Ai = [−1, 1], u
n
i : i = 1, 2},
Γn = {(Ti,Ti, µi) = (I,In−1, λn−1), Ai = [−1, 1], u
n
i : i = 1, 2}.
Here, for any n ≥ 0, the private information game Γ˜n is the same as the game Γn except
the private information structure for each player is updated from (I,In−1, λn−1) to its
countably generated extension (I,In, λn); moreover, the private information game Γn+1
is the same as the game Γ˜n except that for each player i = 1, 2 the payoff structure is




i (a1, a2, t) = ui[a1, a2, hn(t)] for all a1, a2 ∈ [−1, 1].
Finally, we summarize our argument above in the following theorem, notice that
Claims 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 above are special cases.
Theorem 6.3.6. There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the private informa-
tion game Γ˜n, in contrast, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for Γn for each n ≥ 0.
Proof: First we prove the results for Γ˜n = {(Ti,Ti, µi) = (I,In, λn), Ai = [−1, 1], u
n
i :
i = 1, 2}, it is a two player game in which each player has the private information space
(I,In, λn), u
n
i (a1, a2, t) = ui[a1, a2, hn−1(t)]. This game is a variation of the game Γ0, in
particular, for each player i, at the private information t, given the actions (a1, a2), this
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player gets the same payoff as in the game Γ0 as if the private information is hn−1(t).
Notice also that in the game Γ0, one player’s expected payoff relies on the other’s strategy
only through the other’s distribution over the action space. In particular, the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ˜n satisfies the conditions in Lemma 5.3.2. That is, let
νi ∈ M([−1, 1]), i = 1, 2 be player i’s induced distribution, then the best-response
correspondence for player 1 are,


{hn−1(t),−hn−1(t)}, if w(hn−1(t), ν2) = 0
{−hn−1(t)}, if w(hn−1(t), ν2) > 0
{hn−1(t)}, if w(hn−1(t), ν2) < 0.
(6.4)
By Proposition 6.3.4, such ν∗i ∈ DΨn(λn), which means that there exists such an In-
measurable selection, g∗, of Ψn such that the induced distribution of g
∗ is the uniform
distribution λn(g
∗)−1 = ν∗ over [−1, 1]. Now we claim that (g∗, g∗) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of Γ˜n. First, the conditions in Lemma 5.3.2 are satisfied. Indeed, for
player 1, given player 2’s strategy g∗ with the induced uniform distribution on [−1, 1],
then w(hn−1(t), ν
∗) = 0 for any t. As a result, from the best response above, at any
private information t, player 1’s action g∗(t), which is either hn−1(t) or −hn−1(t), is a
best response for player 1. Similarly, we can show that given player 1’s strategy g∗, for
player 2, g∗ is also the best response given any information t. Therefore, (g∗, g∗) is a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium for Γ˜n.
Analogously, we can argue that for each n ≥ 0, there exists no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in game
Γn = {(Ti,Ti, µi) = (I,In−1, λn−1), Ai = [−1, 1], u
n
i : i = 1, 2}.
Suppose that (g∗1 , g
∗
2) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Γn, where g
∗
i is a measurable




i be the induced distribution of
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g∗i . Then for each player i, by Lemma 5.3.2, ν
∗
i is the uniform distribution on [−1/2, 1/2],
moreover, by the best response (6.4), g∗i should be an In−1-measurable selection of Ψn,
where Ψn(t) = {hn−1(t),−hn−1(t)} for all t ∈ I. However, this contradicts Proposition
?? that the uniform distribution ν∗ /∈ DΨn(λn−1), i.e., there exists no such an In−1-
measurable selection of Ψn with the induced distribution ν
∗.
From Theorem 6.3.6, we can observe that the σ-algebras In is more and more richer as
n goes to infinity. In particular, In is a sub-algebra of In+1, or put differently, this players
are allowed to take a richer information structure if the private information structure for
each player is modelled by (I,In, λn). However, regardless of the choice of (I,In, λn),
since it is not a saturated probability space, there always exists a simple game Γn in
which each player’s private information is specified by (I,In, λn), there does not exist a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. However, once the players can update their information
structure with a more richer one, (I,In+1, λn+1), i.e., the game is Γ˜n, there does exist a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. As a result, the non-existence result in Γn is resolved.
This procedure can be repeated so on and so forth. Therefore, in such an approximate
way, we demonstrated the necessity of the private information structure to guarantee the
existence of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in general private information games.
6.4 Discussions
The results presented in this paper both underscore and question the “necessity theory”
presented by Keisler and Sun (2009). On the one hand, in the context of specific cor-
respondence, they show that no finite number of extensions of the underlying measure
space is enough to bypass the necessity of saturated probability spaces: as Figure 3 il-
lustrates, irrespective of the number of extensions, there always exists a correspondence
which exhibits irregularities. On the other hand, if a particular set-valued function that
arises in applied work is at issue, it may not at all be necessary to go to a saturated
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probability space. Depending on the complexity of the function, even a single extension
may suffice, as is the case with Claim 2 above. This latter point attains especial salience
in the context of the theory of large games. To be sure, in keeping with the necessity
results in Keisler and Sun (2009), there exist games without Nash equilibria on an s-
pace extended a finite number of times, but such games may be entirely without interest
in terms of the particular economic or game-theoretic phenomena being modelled. To
repeat the point, as far as the specific model is at issue, a simple countably-generated
extension of the space of players may suffice.
We focussed mainly above on the distributions for the particular correspondence Ψ.
Analogously, similar results can be established for the integral of the other particular






π dλ : π is an I-measurable selection of Π
}
.
We can show that
∫
I Π dλ is convex, in contrast,
∫
I Π dη is not convex; here Propo-
sition 6.2.4 is a special case of this claim. With the sequence of countably generated
Lebesgue extensions (I,In, λn) as well as hn (see Section 5) at hands, we can define new
correspondences Πn to be Πn = Π ◦ hn−1, and establish that
∫
I Πn dλn−1 is not convex,
while
∫
I Πn dλn is convex; and so on ad infinitum. Finally, an additional example based
on a weakly compact action set in an infinite-dimensional separable Banach space is
considered in Khan et al. (1997), and we leave it to the reader to use our resolution of
Claim 3 as detailed here and carry through the arguments presented in Section 6.3.2 to
deal with that example.
This being said, we should like to conclude this paper with two open questions. The
first concerns the correspondence in Claim 6.1.1 about which we have been totally silent
in the context of the necessity theory. This was inevitable in light of the fact that the two
operations of distribution and integration over the entire domain space, as considered in
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this paper, are not really at issue in Claim 6.1.1. What is important there is the existence
of a selection for which the integral is null for each interval [0, t], t ∈ [0, 1]. Whereas such
a selection can surely be found for a Loeb counting space, it is not at all clear as to
the shape of this requirement for a general saturated space. In particular, there is no
necessity theory here to appeal to and to try and circumvent. One suspects that the
issue hinges on the homogeneity property, one that is discussed in Fajardo and Keisler
(2002, Section 2D), and in the context of large non-anonymous games, in Khan and Sun
(1996), but a clear formulation and possible resolution would have to await future work.
Such work would presumably have to build on the reformulated theory of large games
presented in Khan et al. (2005) that is constructed around the precise correspondence
considered in Claim 6.1.1.
Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
The chapter concludes its comprehensive overview of the results that have been obtained
by suggesting several open problems.
The ELLN approach
In main result, Theorem 4.2.1 in Chapter 4, compared with Podczeck (2009) and
Loeb and Sun (2009), we adopt the ELLN approach. As mentioned before, one advantage
of this ELLN approach is that one can simultaneously obtain many required purification
mappings. In particular, these purification mappings can be indexed by a full subset in
an atomless probability space. In the context of private information games, starting from
one mixed strategy equilibrium of the game (the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium
is well-known), then by an appeal of our purification theorem via ELLN, one can obtain
many pure strategy equilibria for such a game. Here, it is of interest to investigate the
problem related to the cardinality of the pure strategy equilibria in such games. One
relevant line of literature to this cardinality problem in private information games might
be the study of ex post Nash equilibrium of a large game with idiosyncratic uncertainty,
which is already considered in Theorem 7 of Khan and Sun (2002, p. 1792). Further
results on ex post Nash equilibrium in large games are established in Khan et al. (2005)
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and Sun (2007a).
Independence Assumption in Private Information Games
It is worthwhile to mention that for game theoretical models as in Milgrom and Weber
(1985) and Radner and Rosenthal (1982), and the benchmark model in Chapter 5 as well,
the (conditionally) independence condition for the information structure (Assumption
5.2.1) plays an important role. In particular, it follows from this independence condition
that each player’s expected payoff depends on the others’ strategies only through the
induced distributions on their action spaces, then one can apply Theorem 4.2.1 to ob-
tain the strong purifications for any mixed strategy profile. However, one may criticize
that this independence is too ideal an assumption for games with private information,
correlation among private information structure conditional on some common known or
publicly announced state may be common from a viewpoint of applications.
In Yannelis and Rustichini (1991), a model of Bayesian game without such an in-
dependence condition was introduced where the state space is a probability space and
each player’s information structure is a general measurable partition of this state s-
pace.1 A positive result on the existence of pure strategy equilibria was established in
Yannelis and Rustichini (1991, Theorem 5.2) by modeling the state space as an atomless
probability space and by modeling the set of strategies of each player via a Rℓ-valued
correspondence which is convex-valued and integrably bounded. However, by modeling
the set of strategies for each player via a more general Banach-valued correspondence,
one can only obtain an approximate pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. It is intuitively
clear that by formalizing the state space as a saturated probability space, and appealing
to the results in Podczeck (2008) and Sun and Yannelis (2008), one can obtain a similar
positive result as in the general setting of Yannelis and Rustichini (1991). We hope to
1See Yannelis and Rustichini (1991, Section 6) for the comparison between this model and those in
Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Radner and Rosenthal (1982), see also Yannelis (2009) for a Bayesian
game theoretic model with a continuum of players.
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take the details up in a subsequent paper.
Applications in Cooperative Game Theory
The theory of the value, as shaped by Aumann and Shapley (1974), and relying on
a construction of Kannai (1966), hinges crucially on the set of agents being modeled by
probability spaces isomorphic to the the Lebesgue unit interval, which is called Stan-
dardness Assumption (see Aumann and Shapley 1974, p.13, (2.1)). And, some problems
may occur with such a standard assumption; see Aumann and Shapley (1974, Chapter
13). In one influential paper Aumann (1975), where the set of agents by Lebesgue unit
interval or some probability isomorphic, Aumann showed the equivalence between the
value allocation and the competitive allocation in a model of large economy.
In Aumann (1975), he implicitly used the idea of nonstandard analysis in the sense
that each player in the large economy occupies ǫ weight in the economy, where ǫ repre-
sents a number which is strictly smaller than any positive number. In a follow up paper,
Brown and Loeb (1977) re-establish the equivalence between value and competitive al-
locations, while the set of agents is modeled by a hyperfinite set, or a hyperfinite Loeb
counting space.
Now, as an appeal of the general technique of Keisler and Sun (2009), it is of interest
to investigate whether such a value equivalence result is still valid when modeling the set
of agents by saturated probability spaces, and above all, it still remains open on how to
define the value in such a large economy.
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